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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Topical Introduction to the Thesis
Every measurement is prone to error (JCGM-WG1, 2008, 1.2.3.).
Let us demonstrate what we mean by that with the following simple example:
When reading the temperature off a mercury-thermometer, several things can lead to
the value being incorrect. The thermometer might be placed at a point that is not rep-
resentative of the areas average temperature, like next to an oven or in the shade. The
resolution of the scale is bounded, so temperature differences smaller than 0.1 degrees
might be difficult to observe. If the thermometer was produced too cheaply, the scale
might even be wrong, if the reader has bad eyesight the measurement will not be precise.
Finally, the interpretation might be wrong, e.g. someone interprets a Celsius scale as
Fahrenheit. While a digital thermometer can potentially solve all of these issues, it is
still possible that two identically manufactured thermometers observe slightly different
temperatures at the same time and place. That is because the digital device introduces
a whole new set of errors, like rounding errors. In fact, a lot of work goes into gauging
thermometers (JCGM-WG1, 2008, H.3.), and minimizing possible errors.
Not only is it important to realize that measurements are prone to error, one should
also know how to handle these errors. As every empirical area of science relies on
data that comes from some kind of measurements, everyone working in such areas must
know how they occur and how to treat them (Stier, 1999, I.1). In economics, errors
appear in several areas. While there is extensive research on different kinds of errors
and how to tell them apart, that will not be the topic of this thesis. Instead, the novel
approach this thesis brings to the field will be the introduction of an error term in areas
where they have not been analyzed yet, or only spuriously.
In this thesis mathematical models will be used to approximate the reality of a
market situation. The most useful tool in this thesis will be so called sales response
functions (Hruschka, 1996, Ch 5.2, Ch 7.3). Fixing a unit of time, say one period being
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one month, the sales response function will take a marketing variable (like the price of
a product or advertisement budget spent on that product in a given month), and it will
return the number of sold items at the end of the month.
Sales Response Function :Marketing Variable→ Sales (1.1)
Using a simple model like ‘The quantity of sold units is 10 minus the price’ will lead
to sales of 5 units at a price of 5, and 7 units at a price of 3.
Q : {Price p ∈ R+}→ {Sales Q ∈ R+} (1.2)
p 7→ Q(p) = 10− p (1.3)
This particular sales response function comes with several problems, most impor-
tantly, it does not include an error term. Setting a price of 3 will always lead to sales of
7 independent of the month, market fluctuations or other circumstances. But knowing
that measurements must be prone to error, a better sales response function should in-
clude an error term.
So we take a (fair) coin and flip it. When the coin shows ‘heads’, we treat it
as a value of e= 1, when it shows ‘tails’, we treat it as a value of e=−1. We have no
ordinary way of influencing the outcome of the coin flip or knowing the outcome before
observing it. For the purpose of this introduction, this seems to be an adequate way to
model a simple error. If we add the value of the coin flip to the sales response function,
setting a price of 3 might lead to sales of 6 or 8, dependent on what face comes up. We
now have a sales response function with an error term:
Qe : {Price p ∈ R+}→ {Sales Q ∈ R+} (1.4)
p 7→ Qe(p) = 10− p+ e (1.5)
We will use sales response functions with error terms to model markets and evaluate
the performance of procedures. The performance of those procedures however will not
usually be determined by the value of the sales response function. Indeed, a business
usually needs to pursue a more complex objective than optimizing sales of a single
month. This so called objective function will be optimized dependent on the variables
that influence it. A common version is sum of all profits of a given planning horizon.
If we assume that the variable costs of producing one unit of our product to be 2, then
the profit margin will be the price we set minus the costs. A price of 3 will lead to a
margin of 1, which will be the profit for each sold item. At a constant price of 3, the
sales and therefore the profit will be either 6 or 8, and adding them over 12 periods will
lead to a profit between 6 ·12= 72 and 8 ·12= 96.
However, in reality, we do not know the mechanism behind the sales response
function, all we can do is give a price as input and observe an error-loaded sales value
as output, which will then be used to determine the objective, i.e. the profit. The sales
response function itself, i.e. (1.4) is a black-box. The determination of the best input
values with no available previous information will be the heart of this thesis.
1.1. TOPICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 11
In some cases, it is possible to gain information about the true sales response
function even when all that can be observed is the error-loaden terms. Observing a
profit of 84 after 12 periods means an average profit (and sales) of 7, which can lead us
to believe that a price of 3 results in sales of 7 before the error was introduced. While
it is true in this case, it would be seen as ‘too little, too late’, as it took 12 periods to
obtain information about a single value. In order to optimize the objective function, one
needs to include as much information as possible at every period. That is because the
nature of the decision problem at hand allows us to use all the previously gathered data
in the decision of the current period. Therefore the early decisions are almost random
guesses, while later decisions can be quite well-informed.
Practitioners will be able to use our results in situations with no or little infor-
mation, such as entering a new market, launching a new product, or indeed, a company
has just been founded, like a start-up, and even creating a new market through real
innovations. The two main results relevant for application in businesses pertain to
advertizement allocation and pricing, both when information is rare.
In Chapter 2, we will analyze how to split a given advertisement budget onto
several divisions in order to get the maximum total sales over all divisions and the en-
tire planning horizon. Based on theoretical results and the solution in the deterministic
case (i.e. without error terms) we construct an algorithm and have it compete against
three rules of thumb that are well known and generally used in practice. Correctly
interpreting the resulting dataset will require careful analysis.
In Chapter 3, we will determine the best way to set the price of a product in a
monopoly to get the maximum profit over the planning horizon. We analyze eight
different procedures from the literature and have them compete. We evaluate them
based on the market situation.
The dataset that results from the simulation from Chapter 2 has a lot of inter-
esting and unusual properties. This makes answering the question ‘which procedure
leads to the best overall sales’ difficult. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we demonstrate the
complete derivation of the correct null hypotheses for the dataset.
All proofs to mathematical statements which we derived ourselves will be found in
the corresponding chapters or appendices.
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1.2 Preliminaries, Notation and Definitions
Some of the terms that are used within the next chapters are not explicitly or strictly
defined where they appear. We therefore introduce some of them here with a short
definition and/or a source. Note also that there is an index at the end of the thesis.
ANOVA, see Malhotra (2007), Chapter 16
ANOVA is short forAnalysis of Variance. It is a very broad topic, so we brieflymention
the two applications within this thesis:
1. Given a continuous dependent variable y (like profits) and only discrete (which
in this thesis will always mean ‘taking only finitely many values’, like weekdays)
independent variables x1, ...,xn we can measure the influence of the independent
variables xi on the dependent variable y, individually, as well as collectively, as
well as the ‘significance’ of that influence. In Chapter 2 we use an ANOVA to find
the influence of the response functions and their properties on the objective func-
tions of sales and optimality. In Chapter 3 we find the influence of the response
functions on the objective function of forgone profits of the pricing methods.
2. There is a method of performing an ANOVA by means of an OLS estimation. In
Chapter 4 we use this method to derive the formula for the null hypothesis of an
F-test for an ANOVA with all interaction terms.
Bhattacharyya coefficient, see Aherne et al (1997).
Given twoprobability density functions p1, p2 on the samediscrete spaceX = (x1, ...,xn),
the Bhattacharyya coefficient BC is defined as
BC(p1, p2) =
n
∑
i=1
√
p1(x) · p2(x). (1.6)
It is a measure for similarity of the two density functions with 0 ≤ BC ≤ 1, where
BC = 1 ⇐⇒ p1(x) = p2(x)∀x∈X , i.e. when the densities are equal.
Cost function
The cost function, also known as the variable cost of production is the amount of money
a company has to spend on producing a single unit of its goods. Throughout the thesis,
cost functions will be assumed to be constant, and known.
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Dummy-coding of discrete variables, see Greene (1993), Chapter 8
Given a discrete variable X , it can only take a finite number n of possible states s1, ...,sn.
For dummy-coding, we choose one of these states s j as a reference, often called the
reference category. For every i 6= j of the n−1 other states we define a dummy variable
xi. To incorporate the information about the state of a discrete variable into a model,
we define them as
xi =
{
1 if X is in state si
0 else.
(1.7)
The information that X is in the reference state s j is encoded when every variable xi is
zero.
Elasticity, see Hruschka (1996) P. 17
Elasticity is a common tool used in economics to break the behavior of a function down
to a single number. It is closely related to the derivative, which appears as a factor in it.
Given a function f differentiable in x0 with f (x0) 6= 0 we can define the point elasticity
ε f ,x0 of f in x0 as
ε f ,x0 =
∂ f
∂x0
x0
f (x0)
. (1.8)
Often, the analytical definition of a function is unknown, and therefore the actual
derivative cannot be determined. In this case it can still be estimated with two pairs
of points using the arc elasticity: given the points (x0,y0 = f (x0)) and (x1,y1 = f (x1))
with y1 6= 0,x0 6= x1 we define the arc elasticity ε f as
ε f =
∆y
∆x
x1
y1
=
y1− y0
x1− x0
x1
y1
. (1.9)
F-test, see Malhotra (2007), P. 553-554
We use three kinds of F-tests in this thesis, all of them coming from the following idea:
In a linear model, we want to find out if certain linear combinations of coefficients are
‘significantly different’ from being equal to zero.
1. Claiming that every coefficient is already zero will be called a full F-test. It
compares the given linear model to a model in which no predictors exist. Full
F-tests will be used in Chapter 2.
2. Claiming a certain subset of the coefficients are all equal to zero compares the
given linear model to the model of the remaining variables with non-zero coeffi-
cients. This will also be used in Chapter 2.
3. Claiming a specific linear combination being equal to zero can be used to compare
the effects of certain predictors. Itwill be used inChapter 2, and the corresponding
linear combinations will be derived in Chapter 4.
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Heuristic, see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)
Taken from Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, we can define a heuristic as ‘a strategy that ig-
nores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally,
and/or accurately than more complex methods’. Given an optimization problem, such
as those presented in Chapter 2 and 3 it is often not possible or not worthwhile to find
an exact mathematical solution. A heuristic is a method that gives good results and is
constructed to be simple.
Interval
The notation of intervals, i.e. connected subsets of the real numbers will be [a;b] if
the boundary elements a and b are included and (a;b) if they are not, with the obvious
extension to the mixed cases. We choose‘;’ as a separator because ‘,’ is used as a digit
grouping symbol, e.g. 103 = 1,000 and ‘.’ is used as a decimal point, e.g. 10−3 = 0.001
and we wish to avoid ambiguity.
Lambert-W-function, see Corless et al (1996)
Much like the natural logarithm is used to solve the equation y= exp(x), the Lambert-
W-function is used to solve the equation y = x · exp(x). In other words, just like
ln(exp(x)) = x, we have W (x · exp(x)) = x for certain values of x. It will be used in
Chapter 3 to solve certain functions for the optimal price.
Monte Carlo, see Kalos and Whitlock (2009)
In brief, a Monte Carlo simulation uses samples of a probability distribution to create
error terms, and uses the the values of functions loaded by these errors to obtain in-
formation about the functions. A common example is an estimation of pi4 by sampling
points in a square with an inscribed quarter circle.
Natural numbers N
When we use the natural numbers, we generally mean all non-negative integers, i.e. we
include zero. We use N+ for the positive integers, excluding zero.
OLS, see Greene (1993), Chapter 6
OLS is short for Ordinary Least Squares, and is an estimator for linear dependencies.
Much like ANOVA, it is a very broad topic. It tries to find the slope coefficients when
assuming a linear relation between one dependent variable y and one or more indepen-
dent variables x1, ...,xn. These models are called linear models. In the simplest case it
estimates the coefficients β0,β1 of the regression line y= β0+β1xwhen given a dataset
of pairs (xi,yi).
In Chapter 2 we use increasingly complex linear models by adding the products of the
independent variables, which are called interactions. When all the dependent variables
are discrete, there is an equivalence between OLS and ANOVA, which is used in Chap-
ter 4. Furthermore, one of the methods presented in Chapter 3 uses the OLS to estimate
a linear relationship between price and sales.
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Robustness, see Huber (1981)
By robustness in this thesis we mean insensitivity to deviations from the assumptions.
In the context we use it in Chapter 2, we deviate from the assumption that 20 repetitions
are necessary, as results remain valid with 5 repetitions and Bonferroni correction. In
Chapter 3 we deviate from the assumption that the tests should be conducted on a 5%
level, as the results remain valid when deviating to different levels.
Tukey-test, see Tukey (1949)
The Tukey-test is used to compare the effect of two variables within an ANOVA. Given
a significance level α , it tests whether the means of two cells of the ANOVA differ
on that significance level α by testing if their difference is different from zero. We
use Tukey-test in Chapter 3 to compare the pricing procedures pairwise. We can see
which procedure is better from the sign of the difference, and we fill certain tables with
‘points’ whenever one procedure outperforms the other at the specified level α .
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Chapter 2
Allocation Procedures
In this chapter, we present our solution to an allocation problem with error terms and
compare it to rules of thumb frequently used by practitioners. It was accepted for
review several journals and is, by the time of submitting this dissertation, under review
in ‘Journal of Business Economics’. The paper has two authors: Prof. Dr. Harald
Hruschka and me. Changes compared to the original submission consist mainly of
layout changes, and deletion of sections necessary only to the journals. The title of the
paper as submitted to ‘Journal of Business Economics’ was:
Resource Allocation Procedures for Unknown Sales Response Func-
tions with Additive Disturbances
ABSTRACT
We develop an exploration-exploitation algorithm which allocates a fixed resource
(e.g., a fixed budget) to several units with the objective to attain maximum sales. This
algorithm does not require knowledge of the form and the parameters of sales response
functions and is able to cope with additive random disturbances. Note that additive
random disturbances, as a rule, are a component of sales response functions estimated
by econometric methods. We compare the developed algorithm to three rules of thumb
which in practice are often used to solve this allocation problem. The comparison
is based on a Monte Carlo simulation for twenty replications of 384 experimental
constellations, which are obtained from four function types, four procedures (including
our algorithm), similar/varied elasticities, similar/varied saturations, high/low budgets,
and three disturbance levels. A statistical analysis of the simulation results shows that
across a multi-period planning horizon the algorithm performs better than the rules of
thumb considered with respect to two sales-related criteria.
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2.1 Introduction
Allocation decisions in marketing refer to decision variables like advertising budgets,
sales budgets, sales force sizes, and sales calls which are allocated to sales units like
sales districts, customer groups, individual customers, and prospects. Studies using
optimization methods and empirical sales response functions provide evidence to the
importance of such allocation decisions. These studies demonstrate that sales or profits
can be increased by changing allocation of budgets, sales force or sales calls (Beswick
and Cravens (1977); LaForge and Cravens (1985); Sinha and Zoltners (2001)). The
average increase of profit contribution across studies analyzed in the review of Sinha
and Zoltners (2001) compared to the current policies was 4.5 % of which 71 % are due
to different allocations and 29% are due to size changes. The smaller second percentage
can be explained by the well known flat maximum principle (Mantrala et al (1992)).
These studies all require knowledge of the mathematical form of sales response
functions which reproduce the dependence of sales on decision variables. In addition,
they require that parameter values of sales response functions are available, e.g., deter-
mined by econometric methods using historical data or by means of a decision calculus
approach which draws upon managers’ experiences (Gupta and Steenburgh (2008)). Of
course, there are situations in which both econometric methods and decision calculus
cannot be applied. Lack of historical data (e.g., for new sales units), lack of variation of
past allocations, lack of experiences with the investigated or similar markets constitute
possible causes.
In such difficult situations the question arises howmanagementmay arrive at rational
allocation decisions nonetheless. To our knowledge, the only relevant approach was
developed by Albers (1997). For the original German version of this paper, see Albers
(1998), which has the same content but was published in a German journal, rather than
being a conference paper. Albers demonstrates that, in spite of the lack of knowledge
on functional form and parameters, the allocation problem for one resource may be
solved by a heuristic which uses elasticity estimates computed from sales and allocation
variations of previous periods (i.e., iterations). Albers investigates several sales response
functionswith different parameter values. Note that these functions and their parameters
are not used by the heuristic, they only serve to generate values of the dependent variable
sales by deterministic simulation.
To our knowledge, a modified version of this heuristic has been applied in two
related publications. The modification deals with a less difficult situation in which
elasticities are known and constant across periods. Albers (1997) on the other hand
considers the more demanding problem with unknown elasticities which in addition are
updated in each period. One of these publications contains an experimental simulation
study which adds a growth function in order to reproduce product life cycle effects.
This study also considers a second resource to be allocated, but only investigates one
function, namely the multiplicative function (Fischer et al (2011)).
The other publication deals with two functional forms, multiplicative and modified
exponential (Fischer et al (2013)). Sales generated by simulation in this publication
are based on models with true parameter values. These models do not include an
overall disturbance term and therefore are still deterministic. Opposed to Albers (1997)
it is assumed that elasticities are known, but are subject to error. These erroneous
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Method Advantages Issues
First rule of thumb (see Sec-
tion 2.5 for definitions)
stable results lower on average
Second rule of thumb may achieve values close to
the optimum
leads to unusable results in
some constellations, lower
on average
Third rule of thumb works well within a certain
budget range
does not scale well with low
and high budgets
Iteration along elasticities
only as in Albers (1997)
usually converges for deter-
ministic response functions
cannot handle stochastic re-
sponse functions
Iteration with smoothing
and projection (exploration
phase) only
useful allocation results for
stochastic response func-
tions
inferior to rules of thumb
Developed exploration-
exploitation algorithm
performs better than the
rules of thumb even for
stochastic response func-
tions
possibly first such method,
room for improvement
Table 2.1: Comparison of procedures
parameter values are drawn from a probability distribution centered at true values.
Allocation problems are solved alternatively by the modified heuristic and numerical
optimization. The numerical optimization uses the erroneous parameter values only.
By contrast, the modified heuristic also considers generated sales of the previous period
(i.e., iteration) in addition. Therefore the modified heuristic performs better than the
numerical optimization as the latter lacks any feedback mechanism with respect to
previous sales.
Summarizing we note that the simulations presented by Albers (1997), Fischer et al
(2011), Fischer et al (2013) generate deterministic sales values, as their sales response
models do not include an overall disturbance term. Of course, ignoring disturbances
goes against econometrically estimated sales response models which always comprise
such a component (for an excellent overview see Hanssens et al (2001b)). That is why
we decide to remove the limitation to deterministic sales response models and include
additive random disturbances.
We pursue the following research goals in this study. Firstly, we investigate the
performance of the iterative heuristic of Albers (1997) to solve the allocation problem,
if sales are not deterministic but are generated from sales response functions with
additive disturbance terms. Secondly, we develop an alternative iterative algorithm
for non-deterministic sales. This algorithm has no knowledge about functional form,
parameter values and size of random disturbances. Finally, similar to Albers (1997)
we compare to three rules of thumb using several functional forms (i.e., multiplicative,
modified exponential, ADBUDG) to generate sales by simulation.
In Section 2.7 we show that the investigated rules of thumb, which are frequently
used by practitioners, have several shortcomings which can be overcome by switching
to a different procedure. In particular this is a method that practitioners can not only
20 CHAPTER 2. ALLOCATION PROCEDURES
easily implement, but also modify according to their own particular allocation situation.
We also explain how some of the rules of thumb can lead to unusable results, see Table
2.1.
The developed alternative algorithm consists of two stages, exploration and exploita-
tion. March (1991) seems to be the first author combining the concepts of exploration
and exploitation. The idea is to divide the planning horizon into two stages. In the first
stage data are generated to explore the shape of the response functions. In the second
stage the knowledge of their shape is exploited to find optimal values. In each of several
iterations we approximate the unknown functions by quadratic polynomials and obtain
a solution of the allocation problem by quadratic programming.
To understand the problem setting it may be beneficial to keep the following two
examples at the back of one’s head while reading: A manufacturer sells and advertises
in eight different countries. At the beginning of each period (say month or week), the
total advertising budget is allocated onto the eight countries, and at the end of the period,
the total sales figures from each country are reported. As another example think about
the allocation of a given number of total sales calls (=visits by sales representatives) to
several sales districts. Decision makers want to optimize sales/profit in both examples.
Customers in each country or sales district might react differently, and few data (if any)
are known from previous periods.
The managerial implications are twofold: upon entering a new market with no or
very little prior information, the developed algorithm leads to stable results better than
those provided by any rule of thumb. Furthermore, in any situation it yields better
results independent of the circumstances of the market, in particular the size of random
disturbances.
Section 2.2 describes the problem from amathematical point of view. In Section 2.3
we present the necessary preparations for the simulation study, the algorithm is described
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 explains the investigated rules of thumb. The hypotheses
shown in Section 2.6 all maintain that the developed algorithm is superior to these
rules of thumb. Results of the simulation study are presented and discussed in Section
2.7. In Section 2.8, we investigate the performance of the algorithm under conditions
different from those in the simulation study. We also mention several extensions of
the allocation problem which may be solved by modifications of our algorithm. The
algorithm is presented as pseudocode in 2.9 Appendix A. Further evaluation results not
given in the main text can be found in 2.10 Appendix B. Supplementary notes on the
generation of sales response functions can be found in 2.11 Appendix C.
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2.2 Decision Problem
A (scarce) resourceB needs to be allocated to n∈N>1 units. We have one sales response
function fi for each unit i = 1, ...,n which only depends on its allocated input xi. The
sales response function maps the allocated budget at the beginning of the period to the
obtained sales at the end of the period. Inputs must be non-negative and lower than the
resource, i.e., 0≤ xi ≤ B.
In addition, the sum of all inputs must not exceed the resource:
n
∑
i=1
xi ≤ B (2.1)
An n-tuple (x1, ...,xn) satisfying (2.1) is called an allocation. Total sales, i.e, the
sum of sales across all units ∑ni=1 fi(xi), represent the objective of this allocation. The
goal is to find an allocation maximizing total sales:
max
n
∑
i=1
fi(xi) (2.2)
We focus on sales as objective as opposed to profits for several reasons. Firstly, for
the sake of comparability with Albers (1997), who also considers sales. Secondly, if
the resource is fixed, sales and profits should be highly correlated, as the only difference
is the profit contribution for each unit.
Thirdly, it makes calculations and interpretations easier. We doubt that changing
the objective to profit will yield more advantages than problems.
Aswe assume that all sales response functions aremonotonically increasing (thereby
excluding effects such as supersaturation), we conclude that condition (2.1) is binding
and can therefore be rewritten as:
n
∑
i=1
xi = B (2.3)
Example 2.2.1. We now introduce an example which we extend throughout this article
whenever a new concept is introduced. Note how an allocation of a budget B on two
units still has one binding, solvable restriction (2.3) and is therefore a one-dimensional
optimization problem. Our example therefore has three units, to make sure the prob-
lem is not solvable with elementary one-dimensional methods. Furthermore we round
the numbers quite abruptly, indicated by ‘≈’, tomake the examplesmore easily readable.
We assume our company runs advertisements in three different countries, and has a
total advertising budget of B= 6 that needs to be allocated. If we know nothing about
the market, we might choose equal allocations (x1 = 2,x2 = 2,x3 = 2) which satisfy
(2.3).
For each of the three countries we have an advertising response function fi that
transforms the input xi to the sales revenue of the country at the end of that month. In
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our example, these functions will be
f1(x) = 5 3
√
x; f2(x) = 3 8
√
x; f3(x) = 3 8
√
x.
We know these functions are monotonically increasing, and therefore the condition
(2.1) is binding and becomes (2.3). The objective value in this case is
n
∑
i=1
fi(xi) = f1(2)+ f2(2)+ f3(2) = 5
3√2+3 8
√
2+3 8
√
2 (2.4)
≈ 6.3+3.3+3.3= 12.9. (2.5)
The decision problem presented so far makes it possible that no (in other words:
zero) resources are allocated to a unit (e.g., to make no sales calls in certain districts).
Of course, decision makers may find it inappropriate to deprive a unit of all resources.
To cope with such a situation, one defines a new problem in which a modified total
resource B′ := B−∑ni=1 lbi is allocated to the units with functions gi(xi) := fi(lbi+ xi)
where gi is fi shifted by the lower bound. Now the inputs of some (or all) units have
a lower bound lbi ≥ 0 , i.e., the minimal amount of resource allocated to unit i and B′
must be zero or positive. One can henceforth allocate onto the functions gi, however to
simplify the notation we will still refer to the functions as fi. In other words, without
loss of generality, we may assume the lower bounds of fi and hence the lowest possible
value of each xi to be 0.
Example 2.2.2. Assume now, that the budget is actually B= 9, and we have to allocate
at least lbi = 1 to every unit. All we have to do is allocate the remaining budget
B′ = B−
3
∑
i=1
lbi = 9− (1+1+1) = 6 (2.6)
onto the shifted functions gi(xi) := fi(lbi+ xi) = fi(1+ xi)
Albers (1997) derives the following optimality conditions for this decision problem:
xi =
fi(xi)εi
∑ j f j(x j)ε j
B for i= 1, · · · ,n (2.7)
εi denotes the point elasticity of allocation xi which is defined as ∂ fi∂xi ·
xi
fi
. Equation
(2.7) is derived from a Lagrangian and is therefore difficult to motivate ad hoc. However
it is still easily seen that the xi do add up to the total resource B.
Example 2.2.3. The functions in our example aremultiplicative and hence have constant
elasticity, in this case ε1 = 1/3,ε2 = ε3 = 1/8. Taking the sales values fi from the
allocation (2,2,2) from Example 2.2.1, the denominator of (2.7) becomes
6.3 ·1/3+3.3 ·1/8+3.3 ·1/8≈ 2.9,
which leads us to the next allocation of
x1 =
6.3 ·1/3
2.9
B= 0.72 ·6≈ 4.3, x2 = x3 ≈ 0.85.
Indeed, we see that the new objective value is
f1(4.3)+ f2(0.85)+ f3(0.85)≈ 8.1+2.9+2.9= 13.9> 12.9
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2.3 Simulation
In order to analyze the performance of allocation rules, a Monte Carlo simulation is
performed. We choose experimental conditions as close as possible to the original
paper presented by Albers (1997).
The successive steps of the simulation can be characterized as follows:
• select one of four functional forms,
• choose one of two budget levels,
• determine for each sales unit parameters, which depend on (non-) similarity of
elasticities and saturation levels,
• select one of four procedures which determine the allocations to sales units,
• compute deterministic sales given functional form, parameters and allocations,
• select one of three disturbance levels and add appropriate disturbances to obtain
total stochastic sales for each unit.
The simulation comprises 384 constellations, which result from four function types,
four allocation procedures, three disturbance levels, and two budget, elasticity and sat-
uration levels. The simulation is replicated twenty times for each constellation. The
values for these levels will be given in Section 2.3.2.
Within our simulation, we will make the following assumptions:
• The response functions are monotonically increasing, and mostly concave, the
only exception being the S-shaped ADBUDG function, which is convex beyond
its inflection point.
• The budget is constant across all periods.
• ∂ fi∂x j = 0 ∀i 6= j. In particular, the response units are mutually independent and
the objective function is separable.
• There are no lag-effects, i.e. the response value does not depend on the value of
the previous periods
• The error terms added to the response functions are normally distributed with
mean 0.
Note that the last assumption is also the usual one made in the literature on nonlinear
regression models (see Bates and Watts (1988); Seber and Wild (1989); Cook and
Weisberg (1999)).
In the next section we explain which functional forms of sales response functions
serve to compute sales, how parameters for sales units are determined based on prop-
erties of the functions (with respect to the (non-)similarity of elasticities and saturation
levels), and how disturbances are generated.
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2.3.1 Sales Response Functions
We consider the same four functional forms investigated in Albers (1997), i.e., the
multiplicative, the modified exponential, the concave and the S-shaped ADBUDG
functions. The deterministic parts of these functions can be written as follows:
fmul(x) = axb (2.8)
fexp(x) =Mexp(1− exp(−xh)) (2.9)
fadc(x) =Madc
xφc
Gc+ xφc
(2.10)
fadS(x) =MadS
xφS
GS+ xφS
(2.11)
where a,b,Mexp,Madc,MadS,h,Gc,GS,φc,φS all are positive parameters.
We now mention properties of these four functional forms (for more details see, e.g.,
Hanssens et al (2001b)). Mexp,Madc,MadS symbolize maximum values of sales, in other
words sales potentials. Given certain parameter restrictions, the first three functions
allow for a concave shape, i.e., they reproduce positive marginal effects which are
decreasingwith higher values of x. These restrictions are 0< b< 1 for themultiplicative
function, h> 0 for the modified exponential function and 0< φc < 1 for the first version
of the ADBUDG function. The second version of the ADBUDG function fadS leads
to an S-shape for φS > 1. S-shaped functions consist of two sections, separated by
an inflection point. The first section is characterized by increasing positive marginal
effects, the second one by decreasing positive marginal effects.
2.3.2 Determining Parameters of Sales Units
For our simulation, we need to assign values to the parameters of the functions in
2.3.1 which we accomplish by demanding certain mathematical properties from our
functions. Given a functional form from 2.3.1, we need to construct eight sets of
parameters (one for each function) with two such properties: The point elasticity at
the optimal allocation should have a predetermined value, and the functions’ saturation
levels should also take predetermined values. In order to observe possible effects of
elasticity level and saturation level, we allow two different sets of values in the following
way:
Observe Table 2.2, it is constructed inspired by Table 1 in Albers (1997), which can be
found in Appendix 2.11.1 together with a discussion of the differences.
We begin with an experimental condition, say ‘low budget, multiplicative form, varied
elasticity, similar saturation’. Then we take eight multiplicative functions from 2.3.1
and determine their coefficients such that given a low allocation budget of 1,000,000,
the point elasticity of each function at the optimal allocation is one of the eight values
from column 3 of Table 2.2 and the saturations of the eight functions are the values in
column 4 of Table 2.2. For an actual calculation, see Example 2.3.1 below.
This allows us to add the two factors ‘elasticity’ and ‘saturation’ to our experimental
design. If they are ‘similar’, their values are within a close range, so an elasticity around
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sales similar varied similar varied
unit elasticities elasticities saturation levels saturation levels
1 0.26 0.11 6,100,000 4,500,000
2 0.27 0.12 6,200,000 10,000,000
3 0.28 0.13 6,300,000 4,500,000
4 0.29 0.14 6,400,000 10,000,000
5 0.31 0.47 6,600,000 4,500,000
6 0.32 0.48 6,700,000 10,000,000
7 0.33 0.49 6,800,000 4,500,000
8 0.34 0.50 6,900,000 10,000,000
Table 2.2: Function Properties for Parameter Generation
0.3 and saturation around 6,500,000 , while in the ‘varied’ case, four functions will
have a low level, and four will have a high level.
For the multiplicative function, matters are simple, as b is the elasticity, and we set
a :=M ·B−b, where M is the saturation level.
For the other functions, we perform an iterative search for parameter values. As the
saturation level is given, only the remaining parameters need to be determined.
One can derive the elasticity of the modified exponential function as
ε =
exp(−hx)hx
1− exp(−hx) (2.12)
which can be transformed into a fixed-point formula
h=
−log( ε(1−exp(−hx))hx )
x
. (2.13)
Using a starting value h0 > 0 and x= B/8, fixed-point iterations quickly converge to a
positive value for h which satisfies the conditions in Table 2.2.
For the ADBUDG-functions which have an additional parameter, we choose special
values which yield reasonable shapes and ensure stability of the iteration process. The
values are obtained by trial and error and controlled visually (see 2.11.2 Appendix C
for a discussion and explanation as to why this is necessary.).
Example 2.3.1. In our example so far we used three multiplicative functions, whose
coefficients were predetermined. In our simulation study, we want the functions prop-
erties to be fixed, in order to derive the coefficients.
Starting from the desired properties of ε = 1/3 and f (6)≈ 9, we set the exponent b
to be the elasticity b= ε = 1/3 and a=M ·B−b = 9 ·6−1/3 ≈ 5 and we obtain the first
function of Example 2.2.1.
2.3.3 Disturbances
We add normally distributed disturbances u ∼N (0,σ2) to the deterministic part of
each function. Variances σ2 are set to attain a desired share of explained variance (i.e.,
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R2 value) for the dependent variable sales. We consider additive normally distributed
disturbances as these are included in the majority of nonlinear regression models.
Switching to, say, multiplicative error terms might give the algorithm we propose an
unfair advantage as it is based on elasticities. The desired R2 values amount to 0.9, 0.7,
and 0.5. For each function, the error variance σ2 is set to the value which leads the
R2-value closest to its desired value in a regression of that function using 2,000 values
from a discrete uniform distribution of integers as inputs. We choose these values for
R2 as they are easily understood and well known by both practitioners and researchers.
To avoid negative outputs ( f (x)+u can be negative when f (x) is too small), the output
was defined as max( f (x)+u,0). This is a mixed distribution where the discrete value
0 can have positive probability. This only happens in extreme cases, therefore the
distribution of sales is very close to a normal distribution.
Example 2.3.2. Extending the situation from Example 2.2.3 we add the following
standard normally distributed random numbers (u1 =−0.6,u2 = 0.2,u3 =−0.8) to the
sales function, to obtain
f1(4.3)+u1+ f2(0.85)+u2+ f3(0.85)+u3 = 8.1−0.6+2.9+0.2+2.9−0.8= 12.7
In particular, we see the effect the disturbance has on the objective value, as it is now
lower than its value for equal allocations, even though allocation (4.3,0.85,0.85) is
better than (2,2,2) in the deterministic case.
Let us illustrate the process of obtaining the correct variances. We now sample 2,000
points between 0 and 6 on the function f1(x) = 5 3
√
x+ u. We take the data of these
2,000 pairs (x, f (x)) and perform a non-linear least squares regression f (x)∼ axb. This
regression gives a value for the coefficient of determination R2 ≈ 0.67. If we want to
find the variance such that R2 = 0.5 we need to increase the variance of the distribution
we are sampling from. If we want to find the variance such that R2 = 0.7 we need to
decrease it.
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2.4 Developed Algorithm
Albers (1997) intends to show that in allocation problems an iterative heuristic along
elasticities always outperforms rules of thumb, independent from functional form, other
properties of the functions and correlations of starting values with optimal allocations.
He considers for each of the four functions discussed in the previous section eight
constellations of different values of properties and correlations. Sales are computed
on the basis of these functions without adding disturbances though the latter are a
component of most econometric models. Results obtained by his iterative algorithm
are compared to those computed by the three rules of thumbwhich we explain in Section
2.5 below. Overall, his iterative algorithm outperforms all rules of thumb by far.
In our study the iterative algorithm of Albers turns out not to work well for non-
deterministic sales response functions with additive disturbances. Disturbances which
directly affect sales cause elasticities and new allocation values to fluctuate. These
fluctuations can, among other problems, lead to negative slopes and hence negative
elasticities.
To overcome these problems we use a modified exploration-exploitation algorithm. We
call it modified, as the exploration phase does not aim to explore the entire response
surface itself. It only looks at a concave section which is then approximated by a
parabola.
2.4.1 Exploration
For exploration we modify the iterative algorithm of Albers (1997). Estimated elas-
ticities are heavily influenced by the additive disturbances. As the analytical solution
requires elasticities near the optimum, it is worthwhile to emphasize more recent data
points. We therefore perform first order exponential smoothing in the following way:
ε˜t := (1−β )ε˜t−1+β εˆt (2.14)
with β ∈ [0,1]. We use β := 0.85 based on a Monte Carlo simulation with β as a
regressor with discrete values between 0.05 and 1. However, other values can be used,
based on how much influence of the previous period is preferred. ε˜t is the smoothed
elasticity and εˆt the estimated elasticity in period t.
The other modification consists in projecting each elasticity value into the interval
[0.01,0.5], i.e., if the calculated value is above 0.5 it is set to 0.5, and to 0.01 if
it is below 0.01. This value range conforms with the results of meta-analyses of
advertising elasticities (Assmus et al (1984), Sethuraman et al (2011)). Again, in
an actual application a practitioner may choose any interval reasonable based on his
expectations on the limits of the elasticity.
In its exploration stage the algorithm generates data points close to the optimum for
a fixed number of periods. But elasticities still jump around too much. Therefore, there
is dire need for a method which dampens disturbances.
Example 2.4.1. Returning to the initial Example 2.2.1, we might deduce that unit 1 is
more profitable than the other two, and suggest a second allocation of (4,1,1), which
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then (in the deterministic case) yields an objective value of
f1(4)+ f2(1)+ f3(1) = 5
3√4+3 8
√
1+3 8
√
1≈ 8+3+3= 14.
As the functional form is invisible to the allocation methods, we now need to estimate
the arc elasticities, using the formula
εˆi :=
∆ fi
∆xi
x′i
f ′i
where f ′i and x′i denote the values in the second period of unit i. We obtain
εˆ1 =
7.94−6.3
4−2
4
7.94
≈ 0.41, εˆ2 = εˆ3 ≈ 0.09
which is close enough to the actual elasticities of ε1 = 1/3,ε2 = ε3 = 0.125.
For the next allocation we use conditions (2.7) to obtain
x1 = B
εˆ1 f ′1
∑3i=1 εˆi f ′i
= 6 · 3.27
3.82
= 5.15,x2 = x3 = 0.43,
which in turn yields a new objective value of
f1(5.15)+ f2(0.43)+ f3(0.43)≈ 8.63+2.7+2.7= 14.03
and we estimate the next elasticities. For example we obtain
ε1 =
8.63−7.94
5.15−4
5.15
8.63
= 0.36.
Had that value been higher than 0.5, we would have set it to 0.5. Before calculating the
next allocation, we perform exponential smoothing by setting
ε˜1 = (1−0.85) ·0.41+0.85 ·0.36= 0.3675.
2.4.2 Exploitation
The general idea of the exploitation stage of the algorithm can be easily understood
when looking at modified exponential functions with varying parameters. Figure 2.1
shows an example of the modified exponential function for one of the eight sales units
upon which the budget of 8,000,000 is to be allocated, where x is the budget allocated
to that unit and y its sales value. The optimal allocation to the unit in the example drawn
in Figure 2.1 is around 640,000. Nevertheless, even when disturbances are small, the
algorithm and each of the three rules of thumb still fluctuate a lot, showing no sign of
stability, although they do not leave a certain interval of the domain in each variable
(and hence of the codomain).
This area, highlighted by a rectangle in the figure, looks like it can be easily approxi-
mated by a parabola, i.e., a polynomial of degree two. Assuming the functions were
actually polynomials of degree two, quadratic programming gives an exact solution,
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Figure 2.1: True Function and Fitted Parabola
because the total resource restriction (2.3) is linear.
Exploitation consists of two steps. In the first step, for each unit i a quadratic
regression of the form
yi = γi,0+ γi,1 · xi+ γi,2 · (xi)2 (2.15)
is performed, where yi and xi are the sales and allocation values for unit i and γi, j
are the coefficients to be estimated. For each regression, the data consist of all periods
observed so far (using only a smaller number of the most recent values does not improve
results).
In the second step an allocation which is optimal for these approximations obeying
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the total resource restriction is determined by quadratic programming, using the method
of Goldfarb and Idnani (1983). This allocation and its corresponding sales value consti-
tute an additional data point for the next quadratic regression. This two-step process is
repeated until a total of 40 periods is reached, where 40 is the planning horizon within
our study.
A problem arises when γi,2 is estimated as a positive number for any sales unit, as
the matrix in the quadratic program is no longer positive definite. In particular, this
means that the sampled area suggests a convex shape of the sales function, which is
problematic. If the function can still be estimated as monotonically increasing however,
this can be remedied by setting γi,1 to the slope of the regression line, and setting γi,2
to a negative value close to zero (we choose −10−15), thereby forcing the quadratic
program to accept something that is basically a straight line rather than a parabola.
In the worst-case-scenario, additionally, the slope of the regression line may be nega-
tive. This case is very rare and the allocation to this unit will almost certainly be zero.
One should remember however, what this actually means: The shape of the data points
resembles a monotonically decreasing, convex(!) function and would hence arise either
from a few very unfavorable disturbances in a row or an outer influence that cannot
be explained by additive disturbances. Surely, in this case, the function should be
thoroughly analyzed instead of continuing the application of any algorithm or heuristic.
The situation will be briefly mentioned in Section 2.8.
We abstain from offering a numerical example in the sake of length and readability,
as such an example would not lead to further understanding of the issues.
It is furthermore reasonable to ask whether exploration and exploitation are both
necessary, and what the optimal period is to switch from exploration to exploitation.
Figure 2.2 shows the average means of total sales and optimality (defined as ratio of
total sales and optimal total sales) for all constellations of the exploration-exploitation
procedures, for switches from exploration to exploitation at t = 3,5,10,20,30 periods.
Switching after three periods represents the case of only exploitation and switching
after 30 periods is essentially only exploration. Figure 2.2 implies visually, that neither
of these extremes are useful, and a balance between them must be found. For this
simulation, we therefore switch from exploration to exploitation at period 10.
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Figure 2.2: Means when switching after t periods
2.5 Rules of Thumb
We start from the same rules of thumb as Albers (1997):
1. Allocation proportional to sales of a unit in the previous period.
2. Allocation proportional to sales of a unit divided by its allocation in the previous
period.
3. Allocation proportional to the saturation level of a unit.
The third rule cannot be implemented, as saturation levels, like all parameters of
functions, are unknown. That is why we replace it by the following rule.
3.’ Allocation proportional to maximum sales of a unit observed so far.
This is an appropriate substitute for the third rule using maximum sales as proxy of the
saturation level.
For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to rules 1, 2 and 3’ as first, second, and
third rule of thumb, respectively.
Example 2.5.1. Starting from the allocation (4,1,1) from Example 2.4.1, the first rule
suggests to use as next allocation x′i = B · fi/(∑3i=1 fi) leading to
x′1 = 7.9/(7.9+3+3) = 3.42, x
′
2 = x
′
3 = 3/13.9= 1.29
and an objective value of
7.53+3.1+3.1= 13.73
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Rule 2 suggests using x′i = B · fixi /(∑
3
i=1
fi
xi
) leading to
x′1 = 1.5, x
′
2 = x
′
3 = 2.25
and an objective value of
5.7+3.3+3.3= 12.3.
The third rule uses the maximal observed values of each unit. For the first unit, that is
7.94, for the second and third unit that is 3.27. So we allocate
x1 = B · 7.947.94+3.27+3.27 = 3.29, x2 = x3 = B ·
3.27
7.94+3.27+3.27
= 1.35
and obtain an objective value of
7.44+3.11+3.11= 13.66.
2.6 Hypotheses
To properly asses the data from the simulation, we formulate hypotheses which we test
statistically. As we want to determine whether the developed algorithm performs better
than the rules of thumb, we construct one hypothesis for each combination of rule of
thumb and dependent variable:
H 1,a: The developed algorithm leads to higher sales than the first rule of thumb
H 1,b: The developed algorithm leads to higher sales than the second rule of thumb
H 1,c: The developed algorithm leads to higher sales than the third rule of thumb
H 2,a: The developed algorithm leads to sales closer to the optimum than the first rule
of thumb
H 2,b: The developed algorithm leads to sales closer to the optimum than the second
rule of thumb
H 2,c: The developed algorithm leads to sales closer to the optimum than the third rule
of thumb
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2.7 Evaluation of Procedures
For the sake of comparing the developed algorithm we conduct a simulation study
with 384 constellations, which result from four function types, four procedures, sim-
ilar/varied elasticities, similar/varied saturations, two budget-levels, three disturbance
levels and generate twenty replications for each constellation.
We therefore define the following dummy-coded variables for our models:
“Proc” corresponds to the three rules of thumbs and the developed algorithm, “Form”
corresponds to the four types of functions, “Dist” corresponds to the R2 values of
0.9,0.7 and 0.5, “Elas” and “Satu” correspond to “similar” and “varied” elasticities and
saturations, respectively. “Budg” corresponds to the two budget levels of 1,000,000
and 8,000,000.
The objective function of the allocation problem in each constellation can be written
as
max
40
∑
t=1
8
∑
i=1
fi(xt,i) (2.16)
s.t.xt,1+ ...+ xt,8 = B ∀t ∈ {1, ...,40},
Allocations xt,i may depend on previous sales and allocations, i.e., all values fi(xτ,i)
and xτ,i with τ < t may be used to determine the xt,i.
The performance of procedures is measured by two different dependent variables,
“Sales” and “Optimality” which both are computed as arithmetic means across 40
periods. These two dependent variables normalize total sales attained by rules of
thumb or the algorithm. We want normalizations to differ with respect to the (non-
) consideration of additive random disturbances. That is why the denominator in
the definition of “Sales” includes random disturbances, which on the other hand are
excluded by the denominator in the definition of “Optimality”.
The first dependent variable “Sales” equals total sales divided by the maximum
attained value given a fixed functional form and a fixed budget level over all other
constellations. The other constellations result from four allocation procedures, three
disturbance levels, and two budget, elasticity and saturation levels. The division to
compute “Sales” is necessary as the four function types yield quite different values for
total sales (which is especially pronounced in the case of ADBUDG-functions) and the
attainable maximum sales depend on the budget level.
The second dependent variable “Optimality” is defined as ratio of total sales and
optimal total sales. Optimal total sales are determined by optimizing on the basis of
the true response functions without disturbances, i.e., assuming knowledge of sales
response functions and their parameters. Optimality therefore shows to what extent a
procedure which lacks knowledge of the response functions attains optimal total sales
on average. A value of 1.0 for optimality indicates that average total sales as a rule
equal their optimal value.
As mentioned above, the S-shaped ADBUDG-function is not concave, and hence a
problem arises with local and global optima. In particular, the nine control algorithms
that search for the optimal solution may get stuck in local optima. Therefore, optimal-
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Dependent Variable Algorithm Rules of Thumb
1 2 3
Sales 0.8711 0.8522 0.7723 0.86
Optimality 0.9536 0.9305 0.8268 0.9419
Table 2.3: Arithmetic Means of Dependent Variables for Each Procedure
ities greater than 1.0 may be obtained. To avoid such values we additionally divide
optimalities by their highest value.
For each of the four procedures Table 2.3 gives arithmetic means of both dependent
variables. The algorithm attains the highest (i.e., best) values for both dependent
variables, followed by the third rules and the first rule of thumb. The second rule of
thumb attains the worst values.
To thoroughly compare the procedures we start from the following two linear re-
gression models comprising main effects only:
Sales= β1,0+β1,1Proc+β1,2Form+β1,3Dist+β1,4Elas+β1,5Satu+β1,6Budg+ e
(2.17)
Optimality= β2,0+β2,1Proc+β2,2Form+β2,3Dist+β2,4Elas+β2,5Satu+β2,6Budg+ e
(2.18)
In these equations for i = 1,2, βi,0 is the intercept, βi,1,βi,2 ∈ R3, βi,3 ∈ R2, and
βi,4,βi,5βi,6 ∈ R are coefficient vectors, each multiplied by dummy-coded variables, and
e is the usual normally distributed error term.
Reference categories of these dummy-variables are the developed algorithm, the multi-
plicative function, low disturbances (i.e., a sales response functions with high R2 values
of about 0.9), the low budget, and similar values for elasticities and saturations, respec-
tively.
The estimation results of the main effect models both for “Sales” and “Optimality”
are shown in Table 2.4. Coefficients for procedures are in line with the arithmetic means
of Table 2.3. They reflect that all rules of thumb perform worse than the developed
algorithm (the reference category). These coefficients also indicate that allocation
proportional to maximum sales of a unit observed so far (Proc4) performs better than
the other two rules of thumb. The second rule of thumb (Proc3), allocation proportional
to sales of a unit divided by its allocation in the previous period, clearly turns out as
overall worst procedure.
The other coefficients of Table 2.4 indicate whether we obtain higher or lower val-
ues of the two dependent variables for a certain category of the respective independent
variable. To our opinion most of these results are fairly intuitive. The higher com-
plexity of S-shaped ADBUDG functions (=Form4) leads to lower values than the other
functional forms. Both the modified exponential (=Form2) and the concave ADBUDG
function are better than the multiplicative function (the reference category). The coef-
ficients for Dist2 and Dist3 reflect that a higher level of disturbances makes it difficult
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Dependent Variable: Sales Dependent Variable: Optimality
Variable Coefficient t-Value Coefficient t-Value
Intercept 0.81 204.130*** 1.014 274.947***
Proc2 -0.019 -5.833** -0.023 -7.687***
Proc3 -0.099 -30.485*** -0.127 -42.108***
Proc4 -0.011 -3.42*** -0.012 -3.889**
Form2 0.042 12.905*** 0.023 7.476***
Form3 0.078 23.936*** 0.013 4.406***
Form4 -0.135 -41.729*** -0.096 -31.827***
Dist2 -0.011 -3.795*** -0.021 -8.118***
Dist3 -0.038 -13.605*** -0.067 -25.674***
Elas2 0.004 1.884 -0.046 -21.608***
Satu2 0.067 29.382*** -0.036 -17.067***
Budg2 0.091 39.491*** 0.05 23.640***
d f = 7668 R2 = 0.5325,R2ad j = 0.5318 R
2 = 0.4485,R2ad j = 0.4478
* p-value<0.05, ** p-value<0.01, *** p -value<0.001
Table 2.4: Main Effect Regression Models
to attain good values of both dependent variables. Varied elasticities are accompanied
by lower optimality values, but do not have a significant effect on sales. If saturations
are varied, sales are higher, but optimality is lower. Higher sales are simply a conse-
quence of upward scaled functions. On the other hand, varied saturations lead to higher
derivatives and fluctuations which both make optimization more difficult. Positive and
significant coefficients for Budget indicate that higher budgets favour higher values of
both dependent variables.
2.7.1 Results for Regression Models with Interactions
We also estimate regression models which in addition include certain sets of interaction
terms. The most simple of these models includes only pairwise interactions (see 2.10.3
Appendix B).
To consider additional interaction terms, we also investigate models (one for each
dependent variable) with all triple, quadruple, quintuple and sextuple interactions.
Quite interestingly, the full models with sextuple interactions not only lead to the best
variance explanations (adjusted R2 values amount to 0.9257 and 0.8705 for “Sales” and
“Optimality”, respectively), but F-tests also confirm that the full models outperform all
the restricted models. A comprehensive discussion can be found in 2.10.1 Appendix B.
Because of the superiority of the full models we need a test of differences between
the algorithm and each rule of thumb which goes beyond the main effects model by
also considering all interactions. We therefore use the method of Gahler and Hruschka
(2018b) to construct a vector (=matrix with one row) of multiplicities (= appearances)
for the coefficients in the OLS-estimator. The corresponding matrix (whose product
with the coefficient vector is zero under the null hypothesis) was the basis of an F-
test. Hence a positive product indicates that the algorithm performs better than a rule
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of thumb, and the F-statistic reveals the significance of better performance. A more
detailed explanation can be found in 2.10.2 Appendix B
For the dependent variable “Sales” we obtain average differences between the algorithm
and each of the three rules of thumb of 1.6093, 9.3232, and 0.8757, respectively (the
corresponding F-statistics are 176.4363, 5,922.021 and 52.2406). All of these are are
significant at a level (far) below 0.001, supporting H 1,a, H 1,b and H 1,c.
For the other dependent variable “Optimality” we obtain differences of 1.9223,
11.8959 and 0.8215, respectively (F-statistics are 198.7278, 7,610.8667 and 36.2925).
All of these are significant at a level (far) below 0.001, supporting H 2,a, H 2,b and H 2,c.
In the analysis above, we use 20 replications as we have a large model and wish to
have 20 times more data points than variables.
To answer a question from one of the anonymous reviewers we reduce the number
of replications to five. We also perform a Bonferroni correction to take into account
that we make multiple comparisons between procedures. The robustness of our results
is confirmed by this additional analysis which shows that the effect differences between
the rules of thumb and our procedure as described above keep their correct signs (i.e.,
the effect of the procedure is higher than the effect of each rule of thumb), the corre-
sponding F-tests remain significant below α = 0.001 and the combined significances
from the Bonferroni correction remain below 0.001 as well. Therefore, even under these
restrictive conditions, the null hypotheses can be rejected, individually and collectively.
Furthermore, issues might be raised concerning the similarity of the results for the
suggested procedure and the third rule of thumb. Ignoring for a while that the goal of
hypothesis testing is finding whether differences are significant despite magnitude of
means, we can take a look at the distribution of the obtained values for optimality and
sales after 40 periods as a box-plot. Observe Figure 2.3 containing these box-plots.
We see that the third rule of thumb not only has more outliers, but also more extreme
outliers. With respect to optimality, there are individual outliers below 50%, i.e. the
rule leads to values over the entire planning horizon that are below half of the optimal
possible values and quite a lot of the outliers are below 70%. For sales, this holds true
for all methods, however the third rule of thumb now has many outliers below 40%.
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Figure 2.3: Box-Plot of Optimality and Sales
2.8 Conclusion
Our study shows that the iterative algorithm of Albers (1997) is not appropriate if sales
response functions are not deterministic and include additive disturbances. Disturbances
which directly affect sales cause elasticities and new allocation values to fluctuate and
sometimes even produce negative elasticities. Let us remind you that elasticities should
be positive and lie in a certain interval (see Section 2.4.1). Moreover, its performance
does not really improve if elasticity estimates are only projected into this interval. Our
iterative algorithm does not suffer from such problems.
A conventional approach begins by estimating a sales response function for each unit
based on a given data set of sales and allocations. Then the proper allocation problem is
solved by numerical optimization using the estimated sales response functions. Because
of its iterative nature our algorithm is different. In the exploitation stage we start with
an approximation to the unknown sales response functions for each unit using a data
set generated in the exploration stage. These approximations are used as inputs of a
quadratic programming problem whose solution provides new allocations to the units.
These new allocations and sales due to these allocations are added to the data. Based on
the data set enlarged this way, approximations of sales response functions are updated,
for which new allocations are determined by quadratic programming and so on for
several iterations (i.e., periods).
In each iteration the data are extended by allocations determined by an approximate
optimal program and their corresponding sales. Therefore the fit of the approximate
response functions in a neighborhood close to the optimal solution gets more important.
The conventional approach on the other hand tries to estimate response functions that
also fit well for allocations far from the optimal solution.
In addition to the simulation study presented, we also have examined whether
performance of the developed algorithm remains stable if it has to deal with different
conditions. First of all we have analyzed how procedures behave given a different
number of units. The performance of the algorithm remains similar to that obtained in
the simulation no matter whether we consider less (four) or more (twenty) units.
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Remember that in the simulation study in each experimental constellation sales are
generated by functions which have the same form for all units. Of course, in real life
situations, sales response of units may be diverse due to, e.g., economic or cultural
factors which may differ sharply between regions or customer groups. Now, sales
response can no longer be reproduced by different coefficient values and requires the
use of different functional forms. Combinatorics tells us right away that an exhaustive
proof of the superiority of our algorithm in this case is not possible (as we would need
to consider 48 = 65536 different function constellations), so we have looked at several
randomly as well as explicitly designed conditions. We randomly choose the function
type for each unit and repeated this exercise by varying the number of units. Still, for
these constellations, our algorithm usually determines better solutions than the rules of
thumb.
Summing up, we suggest that the developed algorithm should be preferred to the
investigated rules of thumb and the iterative algorithm of Albers (1997) if marketing
allocation problems of the form shown in Section 2.2 must be solved and the underlying
sales response functions are unknown and not deterministic. We justify this suggestion
by the good performance of the algorithm demonstrated by the simulation study and its
stability under changing conditions.
Future work might consider modifications of the algorithm for the decision problem
investigated here. What effect would it have to choose a different algorithm in the
exploration stage? While different smoothing variations have been attempted for the
exploration phase, none led to improvements. A next goal would be to examine if
other algorithms are more suitable for the exploitation stage. This might mean small
adjustments of parameters, or a completely new algorithm.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, a problem arises if the parabola has a positive leading
coefficient and the regression line has a negative slope. This effect usually occurs if
a unit repeatedly receives allocations near zero. Due to the additive disturbances, the
data set for the regressions then consists of very similar x-values, while the y-values
vary a lot. As low allocations are usually not optimal, an amendment of the algorithm
may be benefical for such situations.
Modifying the algorithm to solve more general marketing decision problems also seems
to be an interesting task of future research. One extended decision problem results if one
or several sales functions may change suddenly, for example due to quality problems,
successful advertising campaigns, entering another stage of the product life cycle or the
addition or eliminations of allocation units. We suspect that under such circumstances
the exploration stage will have to start once again. For situations with gradual change
on the other hand an appropriate adjustment would be to delete older data points
before each iteration. One could also investigate multi-variable generalizations. In one
generalization, allocations affect sales of the same unit as well as sales of other units.
Another more challenging generalization allows for marketing variables of different
types. Examples of such variables are advertising and price or advertising and sales
effort, where both variables have an effect on sales of different units.
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2.9 Appendix A: The Algorithm in Pseudocode
Notation: for two vectors a and b of the same dimension, we denote by 〈a,b〉 their dot
product, and by a∗b the componentwise multiplication, i.e., the vector (aibi)ni=1
Data: x1 = (x11, ...,x1n), x2 start values, 0≤ β ≤ 1 smoothing parameter, maxit: planning horizon,
B: resource, In: identity matrix of dimension n, exex=10: number of iterations in the
exploration stage, f¯ : multidimensional map consisting of the separate response functions in
each component, DF : array which will be filled with the data points of all functions
y1 := f˜ (x1);y2 := f˜ (x2);
while i< exex do
Test(x1,x2,y1,y2);
ε :=
y2−y1
y1
x2−x1
x1
; Epstest(ε) ;
if i≥ 2 then
εsm := ε · (1−β )+ εold ·β
else
εsm := ε;
end
up := y
1∗εsm
〈y1 ,εsm〉 ·B;
εold := εsm;
x2 := x1;y2 := y1;
Test2(up,x2);
x1 := up;y1 := f˜ (x1);
add (x1,y1) to DF ;
end
for i= exex to maxit do
for j = 1 to n do
Perform Regression y j = γ j,0+ γ j,1x j+ γ j,2(x j)2
end
D: Diagonal Matrix containing values −2γ j,2
A: n by n+1-Matrix with −1 in the first column followed by In
d: Vector containing values γ j,1
bv: Vector of length n+1 containing (−B,0,0, ...,0)
up:=solve.QP(D,d,A,bv)
x1 := up;y1 := f˜ (x1);
add (x1,y1) to DF ;
end
Algorithm 1: Developed Algorithm
Remark: The functions Test and Test2 check if the entries are too small or too close
to each other, Epstest projects elasticities into the Interval [0.01,0.5].
The function solve.QP solves the quadratic program as described in Goldfarb and Idnani
(1983) with the notation from the R-Package “quadprog” by Berwin and Turlach (2013).
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2.10 Appendix B: Additional Regression Results
2.10.1 Comparison of Nested Models
While Table 2.4 has entries from which certain statements can be deduced, one should
take these values with a grain of salt. The R2 and adjusted R2 of these main effect
models amount to 0.5325 and 0.5318 for sales and 0.4485 and 0.4478 for optimalities,
respectively.
For 1≤ k ≤ 6 we therefore define the k-fold interaction model (or short, k-fold model)
as the linear multiple regression model that contains all interactions up to degree k,
whereby the 1-fold interaction model is just the main effect model and the 6-fold
interaction model is the full model. The R2 and adjusted R2 of these full models amount
to 0.9294 and 0.9257 for sales and 0.877 and 0.8705 for optimalities, respectively.
To be absolutely sure that the full model is better for estimating the effects, we perform
statistical tests. For 1≤ k< k′ ≤ 6, the k-fold model is nested within the k′-fold model.
We therefore perform F-tests between the 6-fold model and each k-fold model nested
within, for both dependent variables. For both dependent variables, the 6-fold model
is superior to the 5-fold model at a significance level of 0.05. In both cases for all
1≤ k < 5, the 6-fold model is superior to the k-fold model at a significance level (far)
below 0.001. Note that these tests are in fact necessary, since the F-tests of several
nested models do not always behave in a transitive manner (see Cameron and Trivedi
(2005) Section 7.2.7).
2.10.2 F-Tests in the Full Models
The tests on the full model are conducted by method explained in Gahler and Hruschka
(2018b). Following their notation, the primary variable is the procedure variable, and
the other predictors are secondary variables.
The conditions necessary for using the method are as follows:
1. The multiple regression model contains only categorical predictors.
2. The regression includes all interaction terms of every possible degree.
3. There are no empty cells, i.e. the constructed design matrix is a generic design
matrix in the sense of Definitions 1 and 4 in Gahler and Hruschka (2018b).
The first two conditions are satisfied by construction, the third is satisfied since our
design is balanced.
Furthermore it only makes sense to use the method if the explanatory power of the full
interaction model is higher than for all nested models. This condition is satisfied as
well, as detailed in 2.10.1 Appendix B.
We could use Theorems 2 and 3 from Gahler and Hruschka (2018b) to determine
the estimated cell means from the coefficients. Thankfully we can skip this rather
tedious procedure by directly applying the result from Section 2.3 from Gahler and
Hruschka (2018b), which states that the number of appearances (= the multiplicity)
of a coefficient in the null hypothesis is zero if it does not describe the non-reference
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category one wishes to compare to, and equal to the product of the number of categories
which according to the coefficient are in the reference category otherwise.
Therefore, when comparing the algorithm to the first rule of thumb, coefficients which
represent an interaction term wherein the category of first rule of thumb does not
appear (for example the coefficient of Proc3· Elas2), have a multiplicity of zero. The
multiplicity of all the other coefficients equals the product of the number of categories
for those variables which assume a reference value. For example, the cell where
Proc=ROT1, Form=multiplicative, Dist=0.9, Elas=similar, Satu=varied and Budg=low
has four variables (Form, Dist, Satu and Budg) in their reference categories. The
multiplicity is therefore the product of their numbers of categories: 4 ·3 ·2 ·2= 48.
This way the multiplicity of each coefficient can be determined. The product of
this vector of multiplicities and the OLS estimated coefficients gives the effect of the
algorithm relative to another procedure. The significance of this relative effect can be
obtained using these vectors as basis for an F-test within the model.
2.10.3 Pairwise interactions
By the request of an anonymous reviewer we also investigate regressions with pairwise
interactions. Note that the results from Table 2.5 are again to be taken with a grain of
salt, as the models are significantly improved by adding further and higher interaction
terms (see Appendix 2.10.1), which then also suggests the testing of hypotheses using
the procedures from (names deleted to ensure anonymity).
The share of effect sizes smaller than 0.01 in absolute size for the pairwise interaction
sales model is 65%, for the optimality model 71.67%. The share of p-values below 0.01
for the pairwise interaction sales model is 66.67% and for the optimality model 60%.
2.11 Appendix C: Supplementary material on generat-
ing functions
2.11.1 Albers’ Original Table
The original table from Albers, reproduced as Table 2.6, has more columns and slightly
different values. We start by explaining why we use fewer columns:
Albers compares different starting conditions with respect to the correlation of start-
ing allocations with their optimal values. These starting conditions are constructed by
changing an equal allocation, i.e. the budget is allocated evenly, each unit receives
B/d = 8,000,000/8= 1,000,000 by roughly 5% towards a positive or negative corre-
lation with the optimal allocation. However, this only makes sense in a situation without
random disturbances. In our case, the magnitude of the error terms, even in the case of
R2 = 0.9 (see Section 2.3.3), greatly exceeds a 5% boundary and hence varying starting
conditions are not necessary. Therefore we set equal starting allocations with B/8 for
each unit.
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Dependent Variable: Sales Dependent Variable: Optimality
Variable Coefficient t-Value Coefficient t-Value
(Intercept) 0.778 139.155 *** 1.005 171.887 ***
Proc1 -0.001 -0.165 -0.003 -0.446
Proc2 0.017 2.781 ** -0.007 -1.016
Proc3 -0.006 -0.984 -0.010 -1.621
Form2 0.08 13.041 *** -0.003 -0.451
Form3 0.072 11.721 *** -0.046 -7.146***
Form4 -0.276 -44.992 *** -0.113 -17.635***
Dist2 0.006 1.084 -0.004 -0.691
Dist3 0.012 2.141 * -0.018 -3.04**
Elas1 0.043 8.904 *** -0.047 -9.384***
Satu1 0.145 30.387 *** 0.012 2.484*
Budg8 0.043 9.049 *** -0.026 -5.168***
Proc1:Form2 -0.007 -1.218 -0.007 -1.135
Proc2:Form2 0.047 8.068 *** 0.058 9.574***
Proc3:Form2 -0.001 -0.104 -0.005 -0.806
Proc1:Form3 0 0.071 -0 -0.082
Proc2:Form3 0.05 8.652 *** 0.058 9.528***
Proc3:Form3 0 -0.029 -0.002 -0.261
Proc1:Form4 -0.021 -3.634 *** -0.028 -4.583***
Proc2:Form4 -0.076 -13.155 *** -0.139 -23.085***
Proc3:Form4 -0.066 -11.412 *** -0.081 -13.393***
Proc1:Dist2 0.002 0.327 0.002 0.476
Proc2:Dist2 -0.045 -9.045 *** -0.049 -9.403***
Proc3:Dist2 0.003 0.515 0.006 1.182
Proc1:Dist3 0.001 0.154 -0.002 -0.332
Proc2:Dist3 -0.157 -31.487 *** -0.187 -35.682***
Proc3:Dist3 0.008 1.596 0.014 2.717**
Proc1:Elas1 -0.014 -3.392 *** -0.016 -3.666***
Proc2:Elas1 -0.044 -10.842 *** -0.044 -10.197***
Proc3:Elas1 -0.005 -1.241 0.001 0.244
Proc1:Satu1 -0.013 -3.258 ** -0.014 -3.277**
Proc2:Satu1 -0.099 -24.192 *** -0.1 -23.31***
Proc3:Satu1 -0.008 -1.976 * -0.009 -2.088 *
Proc1:Budg8 0.004 0.873 0.006 1.296
Proc2:Budg8 0.036 8.869 *** 0.072 16.797***
Proc3:Budg8 0.029 7.138 *** 0.035 8.262***
Form2:Dist2 0.016 2.952 ** 0.019 3.547***
Form3:Dist2 0.014 2.885 ** 0.015 2.8**
Form4:Dist2 0.022 4.427 *** -0.006 -1.084
Form2:Dist3 0.008 1.697 0.026 4.922***
Form3:Dist3 0.03 6.042 *** 0.041 7.834 ***
Form4:Dist3 0.05 9.954 *** 0 0.066
Form2:Elas1 -0.059 -14.342 *** 0.016 3.758***
Form3:Elas1 -0.011 -2.575 * -0.024 -5.556 ***
Form4:Elas1 0.039 9.51 *** 0.037 8.579***
Form2:Satu1 -0.031 -7.576 *** -0.017 -3.897***
Form3:Satu1 -0.097 -23.678 *** 0.031 7.166 ***
Form4:Satu1 0.009 2.283 * -0.03 -7.051 ***
Form2:Budg8 -0.022 -5.282 *** -0.001 -0.277
Form3:Budg8 0.064 15.614 *** 0.046 10.75***
Form4:Budg8 0.226 65.131 *** 0.155 36.357***
Dist2:Elas1 -0.007 -2.112 * -0.011 -2.441*
Dist3:Elas1 -0.002 -0.444 -0.009 -0.792
Dist2:Satu1 -0.017 -4.685 *** -0.003 -5.555***
Dist3:Satu1 -0.04 -11.201 *** -0.021 -12.54***
Dist2:Budg8 -0.015 -4.113 *** -0.046 -0.486
Dist3:Budg8 -0.029 -8.208 *** 0.002 1.216
Elas1:Satu1 0.021 7.205 *** 0.004 8.099 ***
Elas1:Budg8 -0.045 -15.479 *** 0 0.025
Satu1:Budg8 -0.020 -7.074 *** -0.008 -2.683 **
R2 = 0.8157,R2ad j = 0.8143 R
2 = 0.7245,R2ad j = 0.7224
* p-value<0.05, ** p-value<0.01, *** p -value<0.001
Table 2.5: Pairwise Interaction Effects Regression Models
Almost Equal profit Variated profit Almost equal Variated
equal Variated contribution at equally contribution at equally multipliers for multipliers for
No. Products elasticities elasticities allocated budgets allocated budgets saturation levels saturation levels
1 A 0.26 0.11 2,500,000 1,000,000 6.1 3
2 B 0.27 0.12 2,500,000 1,000,000 6.2 10
3 C 0.28 0.13 2,500,000 4,000,000 6.3 3
4 D 0.29 0.14 2,500,000 4,000,000 6.4 10
5 E 0.31 0.47 2,500,000 1,000,000 6.6 3
6 F 0.32 0.48 2,500,000 1,000,000 6.7 10
7 G 0.33 0.49 2,500,000 4,000,000 6.8 3
8 H 0.34 0.50 2,500,000 4,000,000 6.9 10
sum 20,000,000 20,000,000
Table 2.6: Original Table from Albers
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We shortly elaborate on the discrepancies in Albers (1997).
Firstly there is a problem concerning the degrees of freedom for determining the func-
tions’ parameters. e.g., for the modified exponential function which has two parameters,
Mexp and h, Albers specifies three restrictions:
1. The elasticity at the optimal allocation must be the elasticity value from Table 2.6.
2. The contribution which is equivalent to sales in our model, as the contribution
margins are never varied) at an input of xi = 1,000,000 must be the contribution
value from Table 2.6.
3. The function’s saturation must be 1,000,000 times the saturation multiplier from
Table 2.6 .
This procedure leads to an overdetermined equation system. The ADBUDG functions
have one additional parameter, but also one additional restriction (φc < 1 and φS > 1).
That is why again overdetermined equation systems result.
Secondly, the third and seventh row from Table 2.6 suggest the existence of functions
with a maximum of 3,000,000, but gives a contradictory value of 4,000,000 at an input
of 1,000,000.
2.11.2 Visually testing S-shaped functions
We use visual control of the graphs of the S-shaped ADBUDG-functions to ensure that
the function does not behave badly. The functions shown here are scaled such that they
only take values between 0 and 1, where 1 is the actual saturation, and the exponent is
greater than 1, i.e. there is an actual S-shape in the graph.
Functions with graphs such as the four in Figure 2.4 are rejected for the following
reasons:
In the first image, the saturation is not reached within the domain of the function.
In the second image, the saturation is reached with an unreasonably small input.
In the third image, the lower bound 0 is not exceeded before a reasonable input.
In the fourth image, the non-constant part of the function is found on an unreasonably
short interval of the input.
To make sure that our functions do not have such undesirable properties, we test them
visually after generating parameter values.
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Figure 2.4: Undesirable function shapes
Chapter 3
Pricing Procedures
In this chapter, we compare pricing procedures in a monopolistic market over several
situations. The article it was based on was accepted for review in the journal ‘Business
Research’. By the time of submitting this dissertation, it is still under review in that
journal, but has not yet been published. The paper has two authors: Prof. Dr. Harald
Hruschka and me. Changes compared to the original submission consist mainly of
layout changes, and deletion of sections necessary only to the journals. The title of the
paper as submitted to ‘Business Research’ was:
Monopolistic Pricing Rules Not Requiring Knowledge of the Price
Response Function
ABSTRACT
We conduct a simulation study to evaluate several heuristic rules which a decision
maker might use to set the price of a product in a monopolistic market if neither the
form nor the parameters of the underlying aggregate price response function are known.
We consider several functional forms with different parameters and properties as well
as error terms of different size. Rules are evaluated by the sum of forgone profits over
planning horizons of different lengths. We group results based on different levels of
elasticities, variable unit costs, and stochastic errors. Comparing the performance of
the rules in each group enables a decision maker to choose the rule most appropriate
for her/his situation. An extension of a rule proposed by Baumol and Quandt (1964)
turns out best across all groups.
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3.1 Introduction
We investigate several heuristic rules intended to determine price with respect to their
capability to approximate optimal profit. Decision makers may resort to such rules
if they know neither the form of the price response function nor its parameters. We
evaluate rules by the sum of forgone profits over planning horizons of different lengths.
Foregone profit in a period is defined as difference between the expected profit achieved
by the rule and the expected optimal profit. Foregone profits are determined by a Monte
Carlo study which generates unit sales (in the following briefly called sales) from static
aggregate price response functions. Let us emphasize that the information about both
form and parameters of the functions is only available for the Monte Carlo study, but
remains hidden for the evaluated pricing rules.
A static aggregate price response function Q(p) links the price of a product to its
sales. As prices of other products do not affect sales we have a monopolistic market.
Such a price response function considers sales for an aggregate of costumers (e.g., all
costumers residing in a certain region) and not sales for individual consumers. The
function is static as it does not include dynamic effects (e.g., lagged prices or lagged
sales) and its parameters are constant across time.
We assume throughout that the cost function is linear with known constant variable
unit costs c. Therefore profit Π(p) as function of price p can be written as:
Π(p) = (p− c)Q(p) (3.1)
We do not include fixed cost in expression (3.1) because it is irrelevant for the
optimal solution. If the price response function and its parameter values are known, the
profit-maximizing price p∗ can be determined by solving the monopolistic pricing rule
(also known as Amoroso-Robinson condition) which includes elasticities (Hruschka
(1996); Hanssens et al (2001a); Hirschey et al (1993)):
p∗ =
ε
ε+1
c (3.2)
For a differentiable response function price elasticities ε can be determined as point
elasticities in the following way:
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
(3.3)
Except for the multiplicative response function (see 3.8 Appendix D) point elastic-
ities vary with price.
Application of the monopolistic pricing rule (3.2) requires knowledge of the un-
derlying price response function. This knowledge can be acquired by econometric
methods, market experiments, customer surveys or expert interviews (Maurice et al
(1992); Simon and Fassnacht (2016)). Econometric methods require at least a moder-
ate number of sales and price observations. For pricing of new products this condition
is never fulfilled. In addition observed prices should show sufficient variation. Market
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experiments are an ideal alternative in terms of external validity, but decision makers
usually avoid them because of very high costs. Customer surveys to obtain estimates
of elasticities (e.g., by conjoint analysis) entail high costs. Expert interviews are less
costly because of the low number of people involved. The external validity of both
customer surveys and expert interviews may be low. In surveys, customers are exposed
to an artificial situation, often with a focus on price. Therefore their responses may
differ from those in the market place (East et al (2013)). It is well known that expert
judgments as a rule perform worse than even very simple statistical models (Camerer
and Johnson (1991)). In addition the assessment of price response of costumers by
experts may be motivationally biased (e.g., sales managers tend to be overconfident and
therefore underestimate the price sensitivity of customers (Markovitch et al (2015))).
As an alternative approach we investigate pricing rules which do not require that a
decision maker knows the price response function and its parameters. These pricing
rules are heuristic, which implies that they are not guaranteed to provide the optimal
price. Nonetheless, profits generated by a rule should be as close as possible to profits
which result at the unknown optimal price p∗.
Such pricing rules are especially appropriate if a decision maker faces a budget
limitation andwants to set the price of a newproduct or the price of a productwhose price
variation in the past is low. Costs involved are much lower compared to experiments,
customer surveys and expert interviews. Contrary to customer surveys and expert
interviews these rules have high external validity as they process responses of customers
in the market place.
We proceed as follows: In Section 3.2 we explain the details of the preparations of
the simulation study, by presenting the decision problem and the overall gains function
in Section 3.2.1 as well as the rules, response functions and error terms in Sections
3.2.2 to 3.2.10. In Section 3.3 we present the results of the simulation by performing
comparison testswithin certain groups outlined in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and presented
in Sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.5. We discuss the results and conclude with Section 3.4.
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3.2 Preparing the Simulation
3.2.1 Decision Problem
Let Q : R+→ R+ be a static aggregate price response function, that maps the price in a
period t to sales in the same period. Q itself is continuous, monotonically decreasing,
and may have concave and convex areas, to allow for an S-shape. Furthermore, Q is
not dependent on the period t.
In our simulation the price range is [1;9], the sales range [0; 1,000,000]. As we do not
round off to integers, the entire simulation is scalable. In other words, these intervals
can be transformed to different ranges and orders of magnitude yielding, as a rule,
identical results.
In accordance with the marketing science literature we take into account that
response functions are not deterministic (Hanssens et al (2001a); Leeflang et al
(2015)). Therefore we add an error term to obtain a stochastic response function
Qs(p) = Q(p)+ e. Errors are normally distributed e∼N (0,σ2) for a given variance
σ2 (whose construction will be explained in Section 3.2.9).
For a known price response function, it would be sufficient to consider expected
sales profit because variable unit cost is constant (Jagpal (1999)). Expected profit can
be written as
Π : R+→ R+, p 7→ (p− c)Q(p). (3.4)
Π(p) is continuous, and hence attains its maximum Π∗ at a price p∗ by Rudin (1976)
(P.89/90 Theorem 4.16) since the interval [1;9] is compact.
We define the forgone profit F(p) at a price p as difference between the expected
profit Π(p) at a price p and the expected profit at the optimal price Π(p∗)
F(p) :=Π(p)−Π(p∗) (3.5)
As Π(p∗) is the global maximum of Π, F is non-positive, and F(p) = 0⇔ p= p∗.
Therefore the global maximum of F is identical to the global maximum of Π and max-
imizing F is equivalent to maximizingΠ. Furthermore, this maximum is unique for all
price response functions which we consider in the simulation (see Section 3.2.4).
The decision problem which we investigate is different, because there is no infor-
mation on the true price response function and its parameters. The decision maker only
observes stochastic salesQs as responses to prices she or he has set in previous periods.
Note that the optimal price, its corresponding profit and the expected profit for a price
p are only determined during our Monte Carlo simulation, they are unknown to the
decision maker and consequently not processed by any of the investigated rules.
Of course, the profit due to a price set by a rule should be as close as possible to
the profit which results for the unknown optimal price p∗. Therefore we measure the
performance of a pricing rule by the sum of forgone profits across a given planning
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horizon of T periods
T
∑
t=1
F(pt). (3.6)
The higher this sum turns out for a pricing rule, the better we evaluate a rule.
With one exception, all the investigated rules require data of previous periods.
Therefore stochastic sales and prices of the first two periods t = 1,2 are equal and
deterministic for each rule. An equivalent perspective is that p1, p2,Qs(p1) and Qs(p2)
are common knowledge. These values will be explained at the beginning of Section
3.3.
3.2.2 Pricing Rules
We compare eight pricing rules in total. Two of these rules are based on arc elastic-
ities and the Amoroso-Robinson condition, two are based on approximating the price
response function by a linear or multiplicative function and three are based on a publi-
cation of Thore (1964). For the purpose of the article, we assume that price response is
elastic and deem elasticities outside the interval [−7;−1.25] unreasonable. Hence, if
an estimated elasticity lies outside this interval, it is projected to the nearest boundary
before determining the price pt in period t.
The eight pricing rules are as follows:
1.) Rule based on arc elasticities (AE).
As the price response function is unknown, we estimate the arc elasticity εt from
observed sales and prices of the previous two periods as:
εt =
Qs(pt−1)−Qs(pt−2)
pt−1− pt−2
pt−2
Qs(pt−2)
(3.7)
(see Monroe (1999)) and insert it into the expression of the monopolistic pricing
rule based on the Amoroso-Robinson condition (3.2) to determine the price in
period t:
p∗t =
εt
εt +1
c (3.8)
2.) Rule based on smoothed arc elasticities (SAE).
We apply first order exponential smoothing to reduce fluctuations of estimated
elasticities. In period t = 3 we define ε˜3 := ε3 as in (3.7), and for t > 3 we define
ε˜t := β ε˜t−1+(1−β )εt−1 with β ∈ (0;1) (3.9)
and finally determine the price according to the Amoroso-Robinson condition
(3.8) with ε˜t replacing εt . A global optimization search provides β = 0.4 as best
value (see 3.5 Appendix A).
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The next two rules approximate the unknown response function by either a mul-
tiplicative or a linear model using observed sales and prices up to period t for
t = 3,4, · · · ,T . Note that usually coefficients of the approximating model change from
period to period.
3.) Rule based on approximating by a multiplicative model (MM).
Log sales are approximated by estimating the double log response model
log(Qs) = b0−b1 log(p) by OLS. Taking its antilog we obtain the multiplica-
tive model Qs = exp(b0)p−b1 . If the multiplicative model is the true response
function, −b1 equals the constant elasticity. As the response function is un-
known, we consider −b1 to be an approximation to the unknown true elasticity.
We define εt :=−b1 and apply Equation (3.8) to compute pt .
4.) Rule based on approximating by a linear model (LM).
We modify rule 3 presented in Baumol and Quandt (1964) which is based on
estimating a linear function for sales and prices of only two periods. If the
true price response function is stochastic, this approach easily runs into troubles
giving a positive price coefficient. We approximate sales by a linear model
Qs = b0−b1p and compute
pt = (b0/b1+ c)/2 (3.10)
from Baumol and Quandt (1964). This expression is equivalent to the static
monopolistic pricing rule if both price response and cost functions are linear and
known.
The next three rules are based on a publication of Thore (1964) and look inter alia
at observed profits Πs(p) which are computed from observed sales by (p− c)Qs(p).
Trying to find the profit maximizing solution they determine the price in period t as
pt = pt−1+∆pt . These rules differ from each other with respect to the computation of
the price change ∆pt .
5.) Constant price changes (CC).
We extend Equation (4) in Thore (1964) which only outputs the sign of a price
change by setting the absolute value of a price change to a constant value α1:
∆pt = α1sign((Πs(pt−1)−Πs(pt−2))(pt−1− pt−2)). (3.11)
The rule builds upon the idea that after a price increase which has led to higher
(lower) profits the decision maker is inclined to increase (decrease) next period’s
price. According to the same reasoning, if a price decrease has led to lower
(higher) profits, the decision maker increases (decreases) next period’s price.
This simple mechanism is reproduced by
sign((Πs(pt−1)−Πs(pt−2))(pt−1− pt−2)). (3.12)
3.2. PREPARING THE SIMULATION 51
If this expression equals one (minus one) price is increased (decreased) by the
constant amount α1. A global optimization determines α1 = 0.3 as best value
(see 3.5 Appendix A).
6.) Price changes dependent on previous absolute price differences (DC).
This rule is similar to the previous rule, but allows price changes to vary. We use
the modification of the rule given by Equation (5) in Thore (1964) defined as:
∆pt = α2
√
|(pt−1− pt−2)|sign((Πs(pt−1)−Πs(pt−2))(pt−1− pt−2)). (3.13)
We decide to insert price differences under the square root instead of the profit dif-
ferences of the original formulation to get similar orders of magnitude. An inde-
pendent simulation confirms that our modification works better than the original
rule fromThore (1964). Price changes are not constant becauseα2
√|(pt−1− pt−2)|
acts as stretch factor to the constant step size given by rule 5. This factor stabi-
lizes the absolute amount of price changes, because higher (lower) previous price
changes favour higher (low) current price changes in absolute terms.
The best value for α2 is found to be 0.4 by the methods presented in 3.5 Appendix
A.
7.) Slope dependent price changes (CS) .
This rule is given by Equation (6) in Thore (1964):
∆pt = α3
Πs(pt−1)−Πs(pt−2)
pt−1− pt−2 . (3.14)
The rule is similar to gradient ascent of the profit function, but replaces the first
derivative by the slope of the straight line connecting observed profits Πs(pt−1)
and Πs(pt−2) (Chiang (1984)). For the price response functions investigated in
the Monte Carlo Simulation gradient ascent with first derivative is known to find
the the optimal solution. Alas, here the derivative cannot be computed because
it requires knowledge of the price response function.
In our study slopes of observed profits take very high absolute values. We there-
fore decide to cushion the rule by the ratio of the interval centers pcenter/Qcenter
(pcenter = 5,Qcenter = Sat/2with Sat as saturation level of the response function).
Introducing this factor leaves us with
∆pt = α3 (pt−1− c) Qs(pt−1)−Qs(pt−2)Qcenter
pcenter
pt−1− pt−2 , (3.15)
ensuring that α3 has the same order of magnitude as α1 and α2. The optimal
value for α3 (see 3.5 Appendix A) was found to be 0.1. Notice further that using
this rule requires a vague knowledge of the function’s saturation level.
8.) Random prices (RP).
Taken from Baumol and Quandt (1964), we sample the price from a uniform
distribution whose lower bound equals unit cost c and whose upper bound equals
9.
Random prices serve as reference method in the evaluation, because the other
pricing rules should perform better.
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3.2.3 Parameter restrictions on Price Response Functions
We want to consider different functions with different properties. The properties of
the five investigated functional forms, explained in Section 3.2.4, depend on their co-
efficients. We therefore start with a table of properties for the functions and choose
coefficients such that the functions adhere to these properties.
We define a low, medium and high level for each of the three properties ‘Maximum’,
(Q(1), the highest possible sales value) ‘Minimum’ (Q(9), the lowest possible sales
value) and ‘Costs’. While the variable unit cost c itself does not influence the functional
form, it is necessary for determining the optimal price p∗ for profits and therefore the
elasticities, which are defined as the point elasticities at the optimum, see Section 3.2.7.
The values are taken from Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Properties
Level Maximum Sales Minimum Sales Variable Unit Costs
Variable name Max Min c
low 500,000 100 2
medium 750,000 500 3
high 1,000,000 1,000 4
3.2.4 Functional Forms
We consider the following five widespread functional forms Hanssens et al (2001a):
1.) The linear function Qlin(p) = a0−a1 p
2.) The multiplicative function Qmult(p) = b0 p−b1
3.) The exponential function Qexp(p) = ec0−c1 p
4.) The semi-logarithmic function Qsemlog(p) = d0−d1 log(p)
5.) The logistic function Qlog(p) = Qmax1+e−( f0− f1 p)
with positive parameters a0,a1,b0,b1,c0,c1,d0,d1, f0, f1 > 0 (see 3.6 Appendix B).
Note that the logistic function has one additional degree of freedom with Qmax which
is the asymptotic maximum of the function. For generating the coefficients, we always
want two degrees of freedom and two restrictions, to be able to uniquely solve for the
coefficients. Therefore, we add a third restriction for the logistic function, namely, that
Qmax is 0.5% higher than the respective maximum sales value shown in Table 3.1 (i.e.,
Qmax =Max ·1.005).
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3.2.5 Setting Coefficients
As we want all of our functions to be comparable, we need them to have similar
properties. We want the highest possible value to be Q(1) = Max, and the lowest
possible value to be Q(9) =Min. With these two restrictions, we can uniquely solve
for the coefficients of these functions (for a proof, see 3.6 Appendix B):
1.) for the linear function:
a0 = 9Max−Min8 ,a1 =
Max−Min
8
2.) for the multiplicative function:
b0 =Max,b1 =
log(b0/Min)
log(9)
3.) for the exponential function:
c0 =
9 log(Max)−log(Min)
8 ,c1 =
log(Max)−log(Min)
8
4.) for the semi-logarithmic function:
d0 =Max,d1 =
d0−Min
log(9)
5.) and for the logistic function:
Qmax = 1.005 ·Max,
f0 =
9 log( MaxQmax−Max )+log(
Qmax−Min
Min )
8 ,
f1 =
log( MaxQmax−Max )+log(
Qmax−Min
Min )
8 .
3.2.6 Determining Optimal Prices
As explained in Section 3.2.1, we need to know the price maximizing the expected
profit. So, for each function type, given its coefficients and variable unit cost c we need
an exact formula for the optimal price p∗. For the semi-logarithmic and the logistic
functions we need to solve equations of the shape y= xex for x, and do so by applying
the Lambert-W -function (see Corless et al (1996)), with x =W (y). The derivation of
the formulae, together with that of the well-definedness of theW -function can be found
in 3.7 Appendix C, and they are as follows:
1.) for the linear function:
p∗ = 1/2( a0a1 + c)
2.) for the multiplicative function:
p∗ = −b1 c−b1+1
this coincideswith theAmoroso-Robinson condition (3.2) for a constant elasticity.
3.) For the exponential function:
p∗ = 1+c1cc1
4.) for the semi-logarithmic function:
p∗ = d1c
W (d1 ce1−d0 )
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5.) and for the logistic function:
p∗ = W (exp( f0−1−c f1))+1+c f1f1 .
3.2.7 Evaluating Elasticities
To analyze the results of the Monte Carlo simulation we also need to know the point
elasticities at the optimum price p∗ (see Section 3.3.2) which for a differentiable price
response function Q(p) are defined by expression (3.3). The point elasticities at p∗ can
be calculated as follows, with the derivation in 3.8 Appendix D:
1.) for the linear function:
ε = −a1p
∗
a0−a1p∗
2.) for the multiplicative function:
ε =−b1
3.) for the exponential function:
ε =−c1p∗
4.) for the semi-logarithmic function:
ε = −d1d0−d1 log(p∗)
5.) and for the logistic function:
ε =− f1p∗
(
1− Qlog(p∗)Qmax
)
.
3.2.8 Restrictions between Rules and Functions
In order to ensure the reasonability of certain rules and functions, we need to pay
attention to certain issues.
First of all, we do not allow for prices to be smaller than the unit cost c or larger than 9.
Should that happen, the price is set to c or 9 respectively.
Furthermore, as we add a normally distributed error term toQ in order to obtainQs, it is
possible to obtain non-positive sales. We prevent that, by setting an absolute minimum
sales of 10 (an order of magnitude below the low minimum level), so the simulation
uses the value max(10,Qs).
This might lead to the fraction in the definition of rule 7.) ‘ThoreStep’ to be ill-defined,
in which case ∆pt is randomly set to either +α3 or −α3.
3.2.9 Error Terms
As mentioned before, we add a normally distributed error term ε ∼N (0,σ2) to the
deterministic part of the response function to obtain the stochastic response function
Qs as Qs(p) := Q(p)+ ε .
Again, we wish to be able to compare different functions while keeping the error level
constant. We achieve that by means of the following procedure:
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We choose a value for the coefficient of determination R2 from {0.9,0.7,0.5} corre-
sponding to a low, medium and high error-term level, respectively. Then we perform
an iterative search over values of σ2. For each value of σ2 we input 2,000 prices
uniformly distributed in the interval [1;9] into the deterministic response function to
obtain Q(p) to which we add errors from N (0,σ2) to obtain stochastic sales Qs(p).
We then estimate the parameters of the response function by nonlinear least squares
and compute its R2-value. We stop the iterative search once the absolute difference to
the desired R2-value is less than 0.0001.
3.2.10 Iterations
We also wish to vary the number of iterations within the simulation. We chose a low,
medium and high number of iterations of 10, 20 and 30 respectively. This includes the
first two predetermined periods, to avoid a possible strictly linear relationship between
the three levels.
3.3 Conducting the Simulation
Now that the preparations are complete, we can start conducting the simulation.
3.3.1 Experimental Designs
Each of the eight rules is used to perform an optimization for every possible constella-
tion. The constellations result from combining 5 functional forms, 3 saturation levels,
3 minimum levels, 3 variable unit cost levels, 3 error term levels, and 3 iteration levels.
We therefore look at a total of 5×35 = 1,215 constellations.
As most of the rules depend on previous values, we start with the following values for
the first two periods: The price in period 1 is 1.5 · c, i.e. 50% above the cost, and the
price in period 2 is e·c1+e where c is the cost and e is a meta-elasticity of -2.5. In other
words, the price in period 2 is the Amoroso-Robinson condition for an elasticity of -2.5.
3.3.2 Performing Tests
The aim of this article is to give advice dependent on the situation the marketing
manager faces. We therefore split our evaluation based on values of the following three
descriptors of the decision situation:
1.) price elasticity,
2.) variable unit cost, and
3.) size of the error terms.
When preparing the simulation, we use variable costs and error terms as factors in the
experimental design, i.e., we are able to choose them before generating the functions.
On the other hand, point elasticities at the optimal price are implied by these functions.
Therefore the cost and error term factors are balanced in the experimental design,
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whereas elasticities are not. As elasticities are on a metric scale we group them into
the intervals [−6;−4],(−4;−3],(−3;−2],(−2;−1] leading to relative group sizes of
5%,16%,47% and 31%, respectively. We note that this distribution of elasticities is
very similar to the one documented in a relevant meta-analysis (Bĳmolt et al (2005))
with relative group sizes of 16%,19%,32% and 31%. A Bhattacharyya coefficient of
0.96 provides evidence to this high similarity (Aherne et al (1997)).
3.3.3 Recommended Rules
The comparisons within a certain group are conducted as follows:
We take the subset of data that belongs to the group we are considering (e.g., all
functions with a point elasticity within (−3,−2] at the optimal price). We then award
points to the rules in the following manner: For each pair of rules (A,B), we perform a
Tukey-test within the ANOVA of that subset. If the p-value of the Tukey-Test is higher
than 0.05, we ignore it. If it is lower, we look at the coefficient of the Tukey-Test (i.e.,
the difference of effects A−B). If it is positive, then the average foregone profits (a
negative number) of B is lower (i.e., has a higher absolute value) than those of A. This
means that A yielded profits closer to the optimum, and A is awarded a point. Otherwise
it is negative, and B is awarded a point.
After analyzing the scores within each group, we add them up to get a total score for the
entire grouping. Note that these total scores differ dependent on the grouping, since
the points are only awarded for significant differences in effects.
Table 3.2: Recommended Rules
Elasticity /Cost/R2 RP LM MM AE SAE CC CS DC
ε ∈ (−2;−1] 3 5 0 0 2 5 3 5
ε ∈ (−3;−2] 3 5 1 0 1 6 3 6
ε ∈ (−4;−3] 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 3
ε ∈ [−6;−4] 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Total 6 11 4 0 4 12 7 14
c= 2 3 5 0 0 2 5 3 5
c= 3 3 5 1 0 1 5 3 6
c= 4 3 5 1 0 1 5 1 5
Total 9 15 2 0 4 15 7 16
R2 = 0.9 3 5 0 0 1 5 3 5
R2 = 0.7 3 5 0 0 1 5 3 5
R2 = 0.5 3 4 0 0 2 5 2 5
Total 9 14 0 0 4 15 8 15
Overall, two main conclusions can be drawn from the top third of Table 3.2, which
groups by point elasticities: First and foremost, the best rules overall are ‘LM’, ‘CC’
and ‘DC’, as they are superior to most other rules in most circumstances. However
when the elasticity lies in the interval of [−6;−4], all rules are more or less equivalent.
Only ‘MM’ is significantly superior to other rules. In fact, when looking at the actual
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Tukey-Tests, it is superior precisely to ‘CC’ and ‘DC’ (see also the top third of Table
3.3) .
We therefore conclude: In the area of moderate elasticities (i.e., (−4;−1]) ‘LM’ as
well as ‘CC’ and ‘DC’ are advisable. Remember however, that the latter two require
determining a step factor. Furthermore, in an area of extreme elasticities (i.e., [−6;−4])
‘MM’ is to be preferred.
The middle section of Table 3.2, which groups by costs, looks quite similar to the
top third. First of all, the advisable rules are once again ‘LM’, ‘CC’ and ‘DC’. However
this time, this comes without the caveat of extreme situations, i.e., none of the groups
behaves as an outlier.
Therefore, we similarly recommend using those three rules and remark the necessity of
a step constant for ‘CC’ and ‘DC’.
The conclusions to be drawn from the bottom third of Table 3.2 are equivalent to
those from the middle.
3.3.4 Unrecommended Rules
By means of essentially the same method, we can advise against some of the rules.
Instead of giving a score of 1 for every time a rule is superior to another, we give a
score of -1 for every time a rule is inferior to another one at a p-value of the Tukey-Test
of at most 0.05.
Table 3.3: Unrecommended Rules
Elasticity /Cost/R2 RP LM MM AE SAE CC CS DC
ε ∈ (−2;−1] -3 0 -6 -6 -5 0 -3 0
ε ∈ (−3;−2] -3 -2 -5 -7 -5 0 -3 0
ε ∈ (−4;−3] -1 0 0 -6 0 0 -1 0
ε ∈ [−6;−4] 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1
Total -7 -2 -11 -19 -10 -1 -7 -1
c= 2 -3 0 -6 -6 -5 0 -3 0
c= 3 -3 -1 -5 -7 -5 0 -3 0
c= 4 -3 0 -4 -7 -4 0 -3 0
Total -9 -1 -15 -20 -14 0 -9 0
R2 = 0.9 -3 0 -5 -6 -5 0 -3 0
R2 = 0.7 -3 0 -5 -6 -5 0 -3 0
R2 = 0.5 -2 0 -6 -6 -4 0 -3 0
Total -8 0 -16 -18 -14 0 -9 0
As suspected from the previous sections, the top third of Table 3.3 confirms that
the rules based on Amoroso-Robinson (‘AE’ and ‘SAE’) are not advisable. For the
interval (−3;−1] we see that additionally ‘MM’ is very inadvisable, in stark contrast
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to [−6;−4], where it is the only recommendable rule. It comes to no surprise that
randomly selecting a price, i.e., rule ‘RP’ is hardly ever a good idea.
The middle section of Table 3.3 further confirms the results obtained so far. The
Amoroso-Robinson-based rules, as well as ‘RP’ and ‘CS’ are inadvisable. So is ‘MM’,
especially when the cost level is comparatively low.
Finally, the bottom third of Table 3.3 rounds out what we have seen before: Neither
the Amoroso-Robinson rules, nor ‘RP’, ‘MM’ or ‘CS’ are generally advisable.
3.3.5 Robustness
We consider results of the the Tukey-Test as significant only if the resulting p-value
was below a threshold of α = 5%. While this may be a common level for significance,
changing this valuemight change the results. We therefore performed the same analyzes
with alternative α-values of 10%,1% and 0.5% and the results were almost unchanged.
This is due to the fact that the vast majority of significant comparisons were so at a level
far below 0.1%. We therefore conclude that our method is robust with respect to the
threshold α .
3.4 Conclusion
We conduct a simulation study to evaluate rules of thumb for setting the price in a
monopolistic market for one product with respect to their capability to approximate
optimal profit. Decision makers may resort to such rules if they know neither the form
of the price response function nor its parameters.
Summarizing what we have seen in the Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we can as a rule
recommend the rules ‘LM’, ‘CC’ and ‘DC’, however ‘CC’ and ‘DC’ require setting an
additional constant. In the special case of extreme elasticities, only ‘MM’ is advised.
However, usually ‘MM’ is inferior to other rules, and is only advised in this case and
possibly in the situations with high cost levels. It does not supersede ‘LM’. In general
‘LM’ is the most advisable rule overall. Table 3.3 further yields that the rules ‘AE’,
‘SAE’,‘CS’ and ‘RP’ are inadvisable, as well as ‘MM’, except for very few situations.
We try to encompass as many different situations as possible to ensure that results
are applicable bymarketingmanagers in a flexible way. Results are not only surprisingly
constant, they also yield a clear favorite, when optimizing and statistically analyzing
forgone profits. This favorite is a modification of a rule introduced in Baumol and
Quandt (1964). This rule is based on a mathematical derivation of the optimal price
given a linear price response function and a linear cost function. The rule also uses
linear regression, which is able to handle different additive error terms. These properties
cause the rule to be the best performing overall in Section 3.3.3, and rarely being
unrecommended in Section 3.3.4.
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3.5 Appendix A: Optimization of Parameters in Rules
of Thumb
To find an optimal value for a parameter of a certain rule, we proceed as follows:
For a parameter µ ∈ R and a rule R = R(µ) which depends on the parameter µ , let
pt(R(µ)) be the price determined by rule R given parameter µ . For t = 1,2 this is the
common-knowledge price from the first two periods, and for t > 2 it is whatever rule R
calculates, based on previous periods’ data. We have four rules that depend on such a
parameter:
1.) Rule 2 (R=SAE) needs a smoothing constant µ = β ,
2.) Rule 5 (R=CC) needs a constant step size µ = α1,
3.) Rule 6 (R=DC) needs a step size factor µ = α2, and
4.) Rule 7 (R=CS) likewise needs a step size factor µ = α3.
We then determine a reasonable range for µ and then discretize this range to a number
of fixed values µ1, ...,µ9.
For R=SAE, the range for µ = β is already (0;1), and we choose the nine discrete values
µ1 = 0.1,µ2 = 0.2, ...,µ9 = 0.9 with a distance of 0.1 between consecutive values.
For R=CC and R=DC respectively, the most useful range for µ = α1 and µ = α2 is
(0;1) as well, so we also choose the same discrete values.
Based on further analysis, for R=CS any value larger that 0.5 was useless, so from the
range (0;0.5) we choose the values µ1 = 0.05,µ2 = 0.1, ...,µ8 = 0.4,µ9 = 0.45 with a
distance of 0.05 between consecutive values.
Given a rule R, for each possible index i= 1, ..,9we perform the price finding optimiza-
tion from the simulation study for the parameter µi by setting the price to be pt(R(µi))
for period t and obtain an average performance value of (forgone) profits and proximity
to the optimal price. Based on the rankings of those two performances compared among
all values µ1, ...,µ9, we chose the parameter µi with the overall best ranking.
We obtained the values of β = 0.4 for R=SAE, α1 = 0.3,α2 = 0.4,α3 = 0.1, for
R=CC, DC and CS respectively.
For R=SAE, we repeated the process with a finer step-size of 0.05, which led to the
same result
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3.6 Appendix B: Derivations of Coefficients
In this section, we derive the coefficients of the five functions, given their properties. As
mentioned earlier, we want all deterministic functions to achieve their predetermined
maximum value Sat at a price of p = 1, and the predetermined minimal value Min at
p= 9. For purpose of readability, we call the maximum Sat instead ofMax throughout
this Appendix. Remember that our functions have two parameters each, leading to two
degrees of freedom, with one exception: The logistic function has a third parameter
Qmax, which is the asymptotic maximum, or supremum. So we set Qmax := 1.005 ·Sat,
so the supremum is 0.5% above the value at p = 1. All we need to do is start with
the equations Q(1) = Sat,Q(9) =Min and possibly Qmax := 1.005 · Sat and solve for
the parameters of the function. We furthermore show that all coefficients are indeed
positive. At some point we use the fact, that the maximal attained value ofMin is 1,000,
and the minimal attained value of Sat is 500,000.
1.) The linear function Qlin(p) = a0−a1 · p.
We start from
Q(1) = a0−a1 = Sat (3.6.1)
Q(9) = a0−9a1 =Min. (3.6.2)
This is just an ordinary system of 2 linear equations, so define
M :=
(
1 −1
1 −9
)
,a :=
(
a0
a1
)
,V :=
(
Sat
Min
)
, (3.6.3)
and all that’s left isMa= V, withM−1 :=
(
9/8 −1/8
1/8 −1/8
)
and hence a=M−1V,
in particular
a0 =
9Sat−Min
8
, (3.6.4)
a1 =
Sat−Min
8
, (3.6.5)
both of which are positive, as Sat >Min.
2.) The multiplicative function Qmult(p) = b0 · p−b1 .
The step Q(1) = b0 = Sat > 0 is fairly straightforward, and then
Q(9) = Sat ·9−b1 =Min (3.6.6)
⇒−b1log(9) = log(Min/Sat) (3.6.7)
⇒b1 = log(Sat/Min)log(9) . (3.6.8)
Again, b1 > 0 as Sat >Min.
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3.) The exponential function Qexp(p) = ec0−c1·p.
Taking the logarithm on both sides of the equations Q(1) = Sat and Q(9) =Min
again leads to a system of linear equations with the same matrixM as in (3.6.3).
We can therefore proceed as in the linear case to obtain:
c0 =
9log(Sat)− log(Min)
8
(3.6.9)
c1 =
log(Sat)− log(Min)
8
=
log(Sat/Min)
8
. (3.6.10)
Again, since Sat >Min, both c0 and c1 are positive.
4.) The semi-logarithmic function Qsemlog(p) = d0−d1 · log(p).
Again, Q(1) = d0 = Sat > 0 is straightforward, followed by (3.6.11)
Q(9) = Sat−d1log(9) =Min (3.6.12)
⇒d1log(9) = Sat−Min (3.6.13)
⇒d1 = Sat−Minlog(9) > 0. (3.6.14)
5.) The logistic function Qlog(p) = Qmax1+e−( f0− f1 ·p) .
The equations
Q(1) = Sat =
Qmax
1+ exp( f1− f0) , and (3.6.15)
Q(9) =Min=
Qmax
1+ exp(9 f1− f0) (3.6.16)
can be transformed into
f1− f0 = log(Qmax−SatSat ) (3.6.17)
9 f1− f0 = log(Qmax−MinMin ). (3.6.18)
We rename the right hand side of (3.6.17) and (3.6.18) as Sˆ := log(Qmax−SatSat ) and
Mˆ := log(Qmax−MinMin ). and again summarize the equations as
−M
(
f0
f1
)
=
(
Sˆ
Mˆ
)
(3.6.19)
and solve my multiplying with −M−1 from the left to obtain
f0 =
−9Sˆ+ Mˆ
8
(3.6.20)
f1 =
−Sˆ+ Mˆ
8
. (3.6.21)
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It remains to show that both coefficients are positive. Note that
Mˆ = log(
Qmax−Min
Min
) = log(Qmax−Min)− log(Min) (3.6.22)
and since
Min≤ 1000,Qmax > S≥ 500.000 (3.6.23)
we have
Qmax−Min> Sat−Min≥ 500.000−1000= 499.000 (3.6.24)
and hence
Mˆ = log(Qmax−Min)− log(Min)> log(499.000)− log(1000)> 6. (3.6.25)
Furthermore
Sˆ= log(
Qmax−Sat
Sat
) = log(
1.005Sat−Sat
Sat
) = log(0.005)<−5, (3.6.26)
and hence
f0 =
−9Sˆ+ Mˆ
8
≥ 51/8> 0 (3.6.27)
f1 =
−Sˆ+ Mˆ
8
≥ 11/8> 0. (3.6.28)
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3.7 Appendix C: Derivations of Prices
In this section we determine the optimal price within the price range, and show that it
is indeed optimal.
We define the profit-function as in (3.1) as Π(p) = (p− c) ·Q(p) and solve
0= ∂Π∂ p = Q(p)+(p− c) ∂Q∂ p for p.
This always leads to a unique solution p∗ in the case of our five functions. We show
that ∂ 2Π∂ p2 = 2 ·
∂Q
∂ p +(p− c) ∂
2Q
∂ p2 is negative, as either
1.) most sales functions Q are decreasing with negative curvature, i.e., the first two
derivatives are non-positive, or
2.) we show directly that ∂ 2Π∂ p2 < 0 everywhere, or
3.) we show that ∂ 2Π∂ p2 < 0 at p
∗.
By Lemma 3.7.1 below, we conclude that even in the case of 3.), the optimum is a
global maximum.
Lemma 3.7.1. In case 3.), the local optimum must be a global one as well.
Proof. We assume that the opposite holds and derive a contradiction. Assume, there
is a point p′ with Π(p′) > Π(p∗) (which is necessarily a boundary point, but that is
irrelevant).
Without loss of generality, let p′ < p∗.
As p∗ is a local maximum, ∃ε>0,p0<p∗ such that p∗− p0 < ε,Π(p∗)−Π(p0) > 0 and
p0 > p′, in other words, there is a point p0 between p′ and p∗ with a smaller profit value
than p∗.
By the intermediate value theorem (Theorem 4.23 in Rudin (1976)), we know there is
another value p1 between p′ and p0 such that Π(p1) =Π(p∗).
By the mean value theorem (Theorem 5.10 in Rudin (1976), applied with f (a) = f (b),
also known as Rolle’s Theorem), there must be yet another value p2 between p1 and p∗
such that ∂Π∂ p (p2) = 0
That is a contradiction to p∗ being the unique solution to ∂Π∂ p (p) = 0
This lemma makes use of two facts about our function:
Firstly, all our functions are twice differentiable on their range. This is well known, as
they are compositions of smooth functions with no singularities near their range.
Secondly, the uniqueness of p∗. We will indeed see below, that for each function
considered, ∂Π∂ p (p) = 0 has exactly one solution.
Furthermore, we make use of the Lambert W function, see Corless et al (1996) for a
discussion.
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1.) The linear function Qlin(p) = a0−a1 · p.
Qlin has derivatives ∂Q∂ p =−a1 < 0 and ∂
2Q
∂ p2 = 0. Hence
0=Q(p)+(p− c)∂Q
∂ p
(3.7.1)
=a0−a1 · p+(p− c) · (−a1) (3.7.2)
=−2 ·a1p+a1c+a0 (3.7.3)
⇒ p∗ =a1 · c+a0
2a1
(3.7.4)
2.) The multiplicative function Qmult(p) = b0 · p−b1 .
Qmult has first and second derivatives ∂Q∂ p =−b1b0p−b1−1 < 0 and
∂ 2Q
∂ p2 = (−b1−1)(−b1)b0p−b1−2 > 0.
Nevertheless,
∂ 2Π
∂ p2
= 2 ·b1b0pb1−1+(p− c) · (b1−1)b1b0pb1−2 (3.7.5)
= b0b1(2pb1−1+(b1−1)pb1−1− c(b1−1)pb1−2) (3.7.6)
= b0b1pb1−1(2+(b1−1)(1− c/p))< 0 (3.7.7)
⇔ (2+(b1−1)(1− c/p)> 0 (3.7.8)
p∗=c −b11−b1⇔ 2+(b1−1)(1− b1+1b1 )> 0 (3.7.9)
⇔ 2+(b1−1)(b1−b1−1b1 ) = 2+
1−b1
b1
> 0 (3.7.10)
⇔ 2b1−b1+1< 0 (3.7.11)
⇔ b1 <−1. (3.7.12)
As we have seen in the section about the distribution of the elasticities, b1 <−1
is always satisfied. Remains to show that indeed p∗ = c b11+b1 :
0= Q(p)+(p− c)∂Q
∂ p
= b0 · pb1 +(p− c)b1b0pb1−1 (3.7.13)
⇒p+b1p−b1c= 0 (3.7.14)
⇒p(1+b1) = cb1 (3.7.15)
⇒p= c b1
1+b1
(3.7.16)
3.) The exponential function Qexp(p) = ec0−c1·p.
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Qexp has derivatives ∂Q∂ p = Q(p) · (−c1) < 0 and ∂
2Q
∂ p2 = Q(p) · c21 > 0. Never-
theless,
∂ 2Π
∂ p2
= 2 ·Q(p) · (−c1)+(p− c)Q(p) · c21 < 0 (3.7.17)
⇔−2 · c1+(p− c)c21 < 0 (3.7.18)
p∗= 1+cc1c1⇔ −2 · c1+ c1(1+ cc1)− c · c21 < 0 (3.7.19)
⇔−2 · c1+ c1+ cc21− cc21 < 0 (3.7.20)
⇔c1 > 0 (3.7.21)
Remains to show that indeed p∗ = 1+cc1c1 :
0= Q(p)+(p− c)∂Q
∂ p
= Q(p)+(p− c) · (−c1) ·Q(p) (3.7.22)
⇔1− (p− c)c1 = 0 (3.7.23)
⇔p− c= 1/(c1) (3.7.24)
⇔p= 1+ cc1
c1
(3.7.25)
4.) The semi-logarithmic function Qsemlog(p) = d0−d1 · log(p).
Qsemlog has derivatives ∂Q∂ p =−d1/p< 0 and ∂
2Q
∂ p2 = d1/p
2 > 0, and yet
∂ 2Π
∂ p2
= 2 ·−d1/p+(p− c) ·d1/p2 < 0 (3.7.26)
⇔−2d1+d1− c ·d1/p=−d1(1+ c/p)< 0, (3.7.27)
and we wish to find the optimal price. We begin by solving for the logarithm
0=
∂Π
∂ p
= Q(p)+(p− c)∂Q
∂ p
= d0−d1 · log(p)+(p− c) · (−d1/p)
(3.7.28)
⇒d1 · log(p) = d0+(p− c)(−d1/p) = d0−d1+ cd1/p (3.7.29)
⇒log(p) = d0/d1−1+ c/p, (3.7.30)
Then, exponentiation, and molding it into a function of the shape yey to apply the
Lambert-W-Function:
⇒ p= exp(d0/d1−1)exp(c/p) (3.7.31)
⇒ cexp(1−d0/d1) = c/pexp(c/p) (3.7.32)
⇒W (cexp(1−d0/d1)) =W (c/pexp(c/p)) = c/p (3.7.33)
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Finally, we can solve for p:
p= c/W (cexp(1−d0/d1)). (3.7.34)
W(y) is always a real, positive number, as long as y> 0. So for well-definedness,
we check that cexp(1−d0/d1)> 0 which is trivial.
5.) The logistic function Qlog(p) = Qmax1+e−( f0− f1 ·p) .
We define D(p) := 1 + e−( f0− f1·p) as the denominator and
E(p) := D(p)−1= e−( f0− f1·p) as the exponential part of the function, to make
calculations shorter and easier. In particular, we have ∂D(p)∂ p =
∂E(p)
∂ p = E(p) · f1.
Qlog has derivatives
∂Q
∂ p
=
−Qmax
D(p)2
exp(−( f0− f1 · p)) f1 < 0 and (3.7.35)
∂ 2Q
∂ p2
=
2Qmax
D(p)3
[E(p)) f1]2+
−Qmax
D(p)2
E(p) f 21 (3.7.36)
=
Qmax
D(p)2
E(p) f 21 (2E(p)/D(p)−1) (3.7.37)
For the sign of the second derivative we use the fact that at the optimum p∗ we
have D(p) = (p− c) f1E(p), which is be shown further down in (3.7.49). The
second derivative is
∂ 2Π
∂ p2
= 2
∂Q
∂ p
+(p− c)∂
2Q
∂ p2
(3.7.38)
=
−2QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)2
E(p) f1+(p− c) QmaxD(p)2E(p) f
2
1 (
2E(p)
D(p)
−1) (3.7.39)
=
QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)2
(−2+(p− c) f1(2E(p)D(p) −1)) (3.7.40)
=
QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)3
(−2D(p)+(p− c) f1(2E(p)−D(p))) (3.7.41)
=
QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)3
(−2D(p)+(p− c) f1(E(p)−1)) (3.7.42)
(3.7.49)
=
QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)3
(−2D(p)+D− (p− c) f1) (3.7.43)
=
QmaxE(p) f1
D(p)3
(−D(p)− (p− c) f1), (3.7.44)
which is indeed negative. So we need to show that p∗ indeed has the claimed
shape, as well as (3.7.49) .
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Start from
0=
∂Π
∂ p
= Q(p)+(p− c)∂Q
∂ p
(3.7.45)
= Q(p)+(p− c)−Qmax
D(p)2
E(p) · f1 (3.7.46)
= Q(p)+Q(p)(p− c) −1
D(p)
E(p) · f1 (3.7.47)
= Q(p)(1+(p− c) − f1
D(p)
E(p)) (3.7.48)
which is equivalent to the desired
D(p) = (p− c) f1E(p) (3.7.49)
and we continue
⇔ 1+E(p) = (p− c) f1E(p) (3.7.50)
⇔ 1= (p− c) f1E(p)−E(p) (3.7.51)
⇔ 1= [(p− c) f1−1]E(p) = [(p− c) f1−1]exp(− f0+ f1 · p) (3.7.52)
Again, we wish to achieve the form yey, so we put everything else on the LHS of
the equation. In particular, we determine the factor of p in the exponent (which
is f1) and replicate the product p f1 at the base.
exp( f0) = [p f1−1− c f1]exp( f1 · p) (3.7.53)
Finally, we replicate everything in the base that’s not yet in the exponent−1−c f1
(by multiplying with the appropriate exponential term)
exp( f0)exp(−1− c f1) = [p f1−1− c f1]exp( f1 · p)exp(−1− c f1) (3.7.54)
⇔exp( f0−1− c f1) = [p f1−1− c f1]exp(p f1−1− c f1). (3.7.55)
We can now apply Lambert-W, and solve for p
W (exp( f0−1− c f1)) = p f1−1− c f1 (3.7.56)
⇔ f1p=W (exp( f0−1− c f1))+1+ c f1 (3.7.57)
to obtain
p=
W (exp( f0−1− c f1))+1+ c f1
f1
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3.8 Appendix D: Derivations of Elasticities
In this chapter we derive expressions for determining the elasticity of demand, which
we defined as the point elasticity as in (3.3) as ε = ∂Q(p)∂ p
p
Q(p) .
We make use of the already determined derivatives ∂Q(p)∂ p from the previous Chapter
3.7.
1.) The linear function Qlin(p) = a0−a1 · p.
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
=
−a1p
a0p−a1 =
a1p
a1−a0p (3.8.1)
2.) The multiplicative function Qmult(P) = b0 · p−b1 .
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
=
−b0b1p−b1−1
b0p−b1
=−b1 (3.8.2)
3.) The exponential function Qexp(p) = ec0−c1·p.
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
=
−c1Qp
Q
=−c1p (3.8.3)
4.) The semi-logarithmic function Qsemlog(p) = d0−d1 · log(p).
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
=
−d1p
pQ
=
−d1
d0−d1 · log(p) =
d1
d1 · log(p)−d0 (3.8.4)
5.) The logistic function Qlog(p) = Qmax1+e−( f0− f1 ·p) =
Qmax
D(p) .
ε =
∂Q(p)
∂ p
p
Q(p)
=
−QmaxE(p)
D(p)2
pD(p)
Qmax
=
−pE(p)
D(p)
=
−pe−( f0− f1·p)
1+ e−( f0− f1·p)
(3.8.5)
=
−p
1+ e( f0− f1·p)
(3.8.6)
Chapter 4
Statistical Procedures
In this chapter, we derive the null hypotheses necessary for comparing the allocation
procedures from Chapter 2. The article it was based on was accepted for review in the
journals ‘Econometrics and Statistics’ and ‘Journal of Applied Statistics’. By the time
of submitting this dissertation, it has not been published in a journal. The paper has
two authors: Prof. Dr. Harald Hruschka and me. Changes compared to the original
submission consist mainly of layout changes, references to the paper from Chapter 2,
and deletion of sections necessary only to the journals. We would like to emphasize
that some of the proofs and constructions in this chapter are highly technical, and that
the most complicated concepts are explained in simpler terms in the Appendix Chapter
4.6. The title of the paper as submitted to ‘Econometrics and Statistics’ was:
Testing effects of categories of one independent variable in full
ANOVA models
ABSTRACT
We construct an exact method to estimate cell means of full ANOVA models defined
by inclusion of all main and all interaction effects. To this end we derive estimated
cell means based on the comparison of OLS estimated intercepts before and after an
appropriate transformation. We further describe how to use cellmeans to test hypotheses
which compare two levels of one independent variable taking all main and interaction
effects into account. We conclude with a final comprehensive example. All calculations
performed in this article can be checked and customized with three accompanying R
files.
Note that the R-files that are mentioned in the paper are not included in this thesis.
69
70 CHAPTER 4. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
4.1 Introduction
Multiple linear regression has been the epitome of a research method in the last hundred
years in many fields of science. While different circumstances may require other
mathematical models, scientists, especially statisticians, still have to master multiple
linear regression.
Cohen (1978) specifically explains and demonstrates how to test lower order interactions
and powers as independent variables in regression models . However, interpretation
of regression models with interaction terms may become quite difficult, especially if
models include higher order interaction terms. We deal with multi-way ANOVA, i.e.,
multiple linear regression with several categorical independent variables (Neter and
Wasserman (1974)). There are several different ways of performing ANOVAs. Beside
the standard way of manually constructing (sums of squares of) distances to means,
one may also consider interpoint distances within and between groups, as demonstrated
in Anderson (2001). However, the complexity of such approaches in a multi-factorial-
design grows quickly with every additional factor. Interpretation of classical ANOVAs
will be highly difficult. In an OLS-setting however, adding a factor just adds columns
to the (rather sparse) design matrix. As the equivalence of ANOVAs and regressions
with dummy-coded variables is well known (see Jobson (1991), Chapter 5.1.3), we will
remain in the setting of the OLS estimator and derive our results with simple linear
algebra.
The standard way of comparing effects in an ANOVA is through contrasts. However,
Embretson (1996) demonstrated that evaluation contrasts on total scores can lead to
spurious interaction effects, with effects showing up when there are none, and vice
versa; even in a mere 2x2 factorial design . We therefore use linear algebra to derive
appropriate null hypotheses in an OLS setting instead of relying on contrasts.
A full ANOVA model is defined by inclusion of all main and all interaction effects.
If every cell, i.e., every combination of values of the independent variables, contributes
in a specific way to the dependent variable, a full model may be superior to less complex
nested ANOVA models with fewer or even no interactions. If one wants to compare the
effects of categories of one selected independent variable on the dependent variable, just
looking at their main effects is not appropriate for a model with interactions. A better
approach consists in interpreting estimated cell means (see Jobson (1991)). But this
approach becomes impractical if the number of cells is high due to many independent
variables or many categories. Then we need a summarizing method which is not
restricted to main effects, but considers all interaction effects as well. In this article we
develop such a method for full ANOVA models. Be warned though, that the presence
of more and higher interactions need to be justified by either a large sample size or large
expected effect sizes (see Cohen et al (2013), Chapter 9.2).
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We start the article proving two Theorems on cell means:
Theorem. For a full N-way dummy-coded ANOVA model, the estimated mean of
a cell containing non-reference categories (c1, ...,cN) is the sum of their interaction
coefficient βˆ1,c1;2,c2;...,N,cN and every coefficient in which only those indices appear, plus
the intercept βˆ0.
Theorem. For a full N-way dummy-coded ANOVA model, the estimated mean of
a cell containing categories (c1, ...,cN) is the sum of their non-reference-interaction
coefficient βˆ(k,ck)ck 6=0 and every coefficient in which only those indices appear, plus the
intercept βˆ0.
To explain these Theorems we start Section 4.2.1 with a very simple full two-
way ANOVA model with only one observation per cell and dichotomous independent
variables. We then deal with models of increasing complexity by allowing more
observations per cell or multichotomous independent variables. We finish this section
by looking at a full N-way ANOVAmodel with multichotomous independent variables.
In Section 4.2.2 we use these Theorems to derive null hypotheses comparing the effects
that different categories of a selected independent variable exert on the dependent
variable. In Section 4.3 we present an example which demonstrates the utility of the
statements from Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. We give a quick outlook in Section 4.4.
Mathematical lemmata used for the derivations are proven in Section 4.5 Appendix
A . This article was originally accompanied by four online resources, three of which
contain explanations and calculations for the examples in this article, including the
example from Section 4.3. The fourth has been turned into Section 4.6 Appendix B for
this thesis.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Interaction Coefficients in full N-way ANOVA models
We begin by explaining the statement and proof of the Theorems for a full two-way
ANOVA model with dichotomous independent variables for one observation per cell.
We then extend this analysis to designs with multiple observations per cell, first for
balanced designs and then unbalanced designs.
We generalize these concepts to a full two-way ANOVA model with multichotomous
independent variables and finally a full N-way ANOVA model with multichotomous
independent variables. To simplify we only write variables in the following if we mean
independent variables. We call the number of rows (and hence also columns) of a
square matrix its dimension, and the number of rows of non-square matrices its length.
Two-way ANOVA with dichotomous variables
One Observation per Cell We begin with a simple example, a dataset consisting of
two dummy-coded dichotomous variables X1,X2 (whose categories we call x01,x11 for
X1 and x02,x12 for X2), and one dependent variable y. Therefore we have four cells to
analyze.
Though it is not strictly necessary for our calculations, we assign real numbers 1,
10, 100 and 1,000 to the dependent variable as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Table with observed cell values
X1\X2 x02 x12
x01 1 10
x11 100 1,000
The values are not important by themselves, we chose them in a way that they differ
by at least an order of magnitude to facilitate understanding.
For the simplest situation, consider exactly these four data rows, represented by
X =

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
 ,y=

1
10
100
1,000
 .
We now perform a linear regression with the variables X1,X2 and their interaction
X1 ·X2. Including the intercept, this gives us four coefficients to be estimated, which
means we have no residual degrees of freedom. Therefore, the OLS estimator is just
the unique solution to the equation system y= X βˆ . In particular, X is invertible and we
have
βˆ = (XTX)−1XT y= X−1(XT )−1XT y= X−11y= X−1y
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with
X−1 =

1 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
1 −1 −1 1

and we get
βˆ =

1
9
99
891
 .
Here the mean of the reference cell (x01,x02) is represented by the intercept which is just
1, which can be seen from the first entry of βˆ and the top left entry in Table 4.1.
If we want a different reference category, we have to change the y-variable to feature
the desired cell in the first entry. Say we want to consider (x11,x12) as the reference cell
(currently represented in the fourth entry of y). We define the permutation matrix R,
which switches the first and fourth entry of y:
R=

0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
 ,
so we have
Ry= R

1
10
100
1,000
=

1,000
10
100
1
 .
Note that R= RT , as R is indeed symmetric.
For our OLS estimator this means
βˆnew = (XTX)−1XTRy=

1,000
−990
−900
891

and its first entry, 1,000, is the value of the new reference cell. Of course, we could
have just as well switched the rows of X , as long as the reference cell value for y has the
same row as the intercept row (1,0,0,0) of X . So, we could have instead calculated the
OLS estimator for RX instead of X to get
((RX)T (RX))−1(RX)T y= (XTRTRX)−1XTRy= (XTX)−1XTRy= βˆnew, (4.2.1)
as permutation matrices are orthogonal, see Lemma 4.5.1 (4).
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Remark 4.2.1. Note that we could have also used the matrix
R′ =

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 .
With R′, the variables remain the same and both categories change. With R, the
variables swap, and they change their categories. Applying R′ to X is equivalent to
redefining the variables X ′1 = 1−X1 and X ′2 = 1−X2, whereas applying R is equivalent
to redefining Xˆ1 = 1−X2 and Xˆ2 = 1−X1, thereby switching both the variables and the
categories. Independent on which of the methods we choose, the desired cell before the
transformation becomes the intercept after the transformation. We choose the former
version for a simple reason: we later construct R for an arbitrarily large number of
variables and categories. This task is easy with the first method, as we only switch
the first entry of the identity matrix with some other entry, independent on the size
of X , whereas the latter construction gets more complicated when the number of cells
increases.
The current goal is to reconstruct the value of 1000 from the original estimate βˆ .
In other words, using OLS coefficient estimates we want to fill in Table 4.2 with entries
just from the estimator.
Table 4.2: Table of cells to be filled in
X1\X2 x02 x12
x01
x11
Obviously, readers might argue that the value 1000, for the bottom right corner of
Table 4.2 is just the sum of all the entries in βˆ , and they would be right, as:
Proposition 4.2.2. (
1 1 1 1
)
βˆ =
(
1 0 0 0
)
βˆnew
Proof. Define the matrix V as
V := XTR(XT )
−1
=

1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0
1 −1 0 0
1 −1 −1 1
 , (4.2.2)
then by Lemma 4.5.2 from Chapter 4.5 Appendix A we know that VXT = XTR,
RTX = XV T and V−1 =V , so we can conclude
βˆnew = (XTX)−1XTRy= (XTX)−1VXT y= (V−1XTX)−1XT y
= (VXTX)−1XT y= (XTRX)−1XT y= (XTRTX)−1XT y
= (XTXV T )−1XT y=V T (XTX)−1XT y=V T βˆ ,
(4.2.3)
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and indeed
(
1 1 1 1
)
1 1 1 1
0 0 −1 −1
0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 1
= (1 0 0 0) .
Remark 4.2.3. Because of symmetry this works the other way around as well, as
(
1 0 0 0
)
1 1 1 1
0 0 −1 −1
0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 1
= (1 1 1 1)
and the other calculations go through without changes. This way of ‘pulling matrices
through the OLS estimator’ is our most beneficial tool. In particular, in every general-
ization step of this method (where necessary), we explain the meaning behind Ry and
prove that ‘R can be pulled through the OLS estimator’.
Balanced Designs Surely, one could argue that OLS estimates have little meaning if
the design matrix is a square matrix. Therefore, in the next steps, we prove the statement
of Proposition 4.2.2 under less restrictive conditions. Note that we do not need X to be
invertible in the proof of Proposition 4.2.2, but use the general statement VXT = XTR.
For more general design matrices, we require a more general version of the matrices X
and R.
Definition 4.2.4. Let X be defined as
X =

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1

then we call X reduced design matrix and call its rows usual rows. All reduced design
matrices appearing in this article are constructed according to Definition 4.2.21 in
Section 4.2.1. Hitherto we will simply provide the matrices themselves. A generic
design matrix M is a matrix that only consists of the usual rows (i.e., only of the rows
of the reduced design matrix), each at least once.
To every generic design matrix M we can define a vector a whose entries denote the
sequence in which the usual rows appear. We call this vector the manifest vector of
M. Obviously, this vector is uniquely determined by M and vice versa. In particular, it
holds that Mi, j = Xai, j. The number of rows in M (and hence of entries in the manifest
vector) is again called its length.
If every entry of the manifest vector appears equally often, we call M balanced.
We will focus on balanced designs first, and then discuss unbalanced designs.
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Example 4.2.5. Of course, X itself is a generic design matrix, which is balanced.
Further, consider the matrices
T =

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

, U1 =
1 0 0 01 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
 andU2 =

1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1

The manifest vector of X itself is (1,2,3,4), and the manifest vector of T would be
(1,2,3,4,3,4,2,1). The other two matrices have no valid manifest vectors, asU1 does
not include the second usual row, and U2 has a non-usual sixth row. In particular, U1
andU2 are not generic design matrices.
Of course, these generic design matrices need to be accompanied by a vector y of
the dependent variable of the same length, where each entry, together with a row from
the design matrix represent a joint measurement of the dependent and independent
variables. Therefore, the manifest vector also identifies the entries of y corresponding
to these cells.
In order for the statement MTR = VMT to remain true in this situation, V still has to
be a square matrix of dimension 4, and is, in fact, the same matrix as defined above in
Equation (4.2.2). If the generic design matrix is of length n, then R is a square matrix
of dimension n. It loses the property of being a simple permutation matrix. As long as
the design matrix is balanced, R remains symmetric. We now demonstrate a possible
construction, still for the situation of a switch between row 1 and 4, i.e., changing both
reference categories.
Definition 4.2.6. Let M be a balanced generic design matrix of length n and
a= (a1,a2, ...,an) its manifest vector. We define the matrix R by means of the fol-
lowing construction.
Let I j ⊂ {1, ...,n} be the set of positions where al = j(⇔ l ∈ I j) for j ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
In other words, let I1 contain precisely those indices l where al = 1, and so forth.
Step 1:
Let R0 be the square matrix of dimension n with columns r1, ...,rn. For every l ∈ I1
the column rl has a 1 in every entry from I4 and a zero in all other positions. For every
l ∈ I4, rl has a 1 in every entry from I1 and a zero in all other positions. Furthermore,
for k = 2,3, for every l ∈ Ik, rl has a 1 in every entry from Ik and a zero in all other
positions.
This makes sure that 1 and 4 get switched, in contrast to 2 and 3, which keep their
positions.
By construction, R0 is symmetric.
Step 2:
Divide the matrix R0 by n/4. Call the resulting matrix R, which is still symmetric.
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Example 4.2.7. Consider the matrix T from Example 4.2.5, with the manifest vector
a= (1,2,3,4,3,4,2,1). Then we have I1 = {1,8}, I2 = {2,7}, I3 = {3,5} and I4 =
{4,6}.
Step 1:
The columns r1 and r8 consist of a 1 in the 4th and 6th position, and zeroes
elsewhere.
The columns r2 and r7 consist of a 1 in the 2nd and 7th position.
The columns r3 and r5 have a 1 in the 3rd and 5th position.
The columns r4 and r6 have a 1 in the 1st and 8th position.
The matrix R0 hence looks like this:
R0 =

0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

Step 2:
Divide the matrix by n/4= 8/4= 2 to obtain R
R=

0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0
0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2
0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2
0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0

And indeed, it holds that
T TR=

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 =VT T ,
and also
Ra= R(1,2,3,4,3,4,2,1)T = (4,2,3,1,3,1,2,4)T ,
which could even be interpreted as the manifest vector of the generic design matrix
(T TR)T = RTT .
What remains to be proven is:
Proposition 4.2.8. Let M be a balanced generic design matrix of length n, a its
manifest vector and y another vector of dimension n. Let V be as in Equation (4.2.2)
and R be constructed from a as in Definition 4.2.6. Let βˆ := (MTM)−1MT y and
βˆnew := (MTM)−1MTRT y.
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1.) Right-multiplication of R toMT replaces the usual column 1 ofMT with the usual
column 4 and vice versa. The other columns remain the same.
2.) Left-multiplication of V toMT replaces the usual column 1 ofMT with the usual
column 4 and vice versa. The other columns remain the same.
3.) MTR=VMT
4.) RTM =MV T
5.) βˆ1 = βˆnew1 + βˆnew2 + βˆnew4 + βˆnew4
6.) βˆnew1 = βˆ1+ βˆ2+ βˆ3+ βˆ4
7.) For a full two-way dummy-coded ANOVA model with dichotomous variables, the
mean of the cell with non-reference categories is the sum of the OLS coefficients.
Remark 4.2.9. Note that by Lemma 4.5.6, all OLS estimators in this article are well-
defined, since by our definition of a generic design matrix M, the matrix MTM is
invertible.
Proof. 1.) The multiplication of MT with a column of R0 belonging to I1 produces
the usual fourth column with a factor of as many times as it appears. The
multiplication with a column of R hence produces the usual fourth column exactly
once. The resulting matrix hence has a usual fourth column in every positionMT
had a usual first column. In the same way, every usual fourth column is replaced
by the usual first column, and the other column types stay the same.
2.) Left-multiplication of V to XT replaces the usual column 1 of XT with the usual
column 4 and vice versa. The other columns remain the same. Hence, by the
definition of matrix multiplication, it does so with every matrix containing the
same columns as XT , and therefore with MT .
3.) Follows immediately from (1) and (2).
4.) Like in Lemma 4.5.2
RTM = (MT (RT )T )T = (MTR)T 3.= (VMT )T =MV T .
5.) Same as in Equation (4.2.3),
V T βˆ =V T (MTM)−1MT y= (MTM(V T )−1)−1MT y= (MTMV T )−1MT y
= (MTRTM)−1MT y= (MTRM)−1MT y= (VMTM)−1MT y
= (MTM)−1(V )−1MT y= (MTM)−1VMT y
= (MTM)−1MTRy= βˆnew
and hence,
βˆ1 = (1,0,0,0)βˆ = (1,1,1,1)V T βˆ = (1,1,1,1)βˆnew
= βˆnew1 + βˆnew2 + βˆnew4 + βˆnew4
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6.) Again,
βˆ1+ βˆ2+ βˆ3+ βˆ4 = (1,1,1,1)βˆ = (1,0,0,0)V T βˆ = (1,0,0,0)βˆnew = βˆnew1
7.) The mean of the cell containing non-reference categories is equal to the intercept
if 1 and 4 are swapped. This is precisely what has been proven in (1) - (6).
Remark 4.2.10. If instead one wishes to know the mean of a different cell, all that is
needed is to switch different entries. Starting with the transposition of indices i, j one
wishes to consider and construct the ‘reduced’ 4 by 4 transition matrix Rred. Define V
as XTRred(XT )−1 where X is the reduced design matrix.
Finally, construct the actual matrix R in analogy to Definition 4.2.6 in order to prove
equality. For the effects vector, simply multiply (1,0,0,0)V T βˆ .
For example, in order to find the effect of the reference category in the first variable and
the non-reference-category in the second variable, one needs to switch indices 1 and 3.
In this situation, Rred and V have the following shapes:
Rred =

0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
 ,V =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 −1 −1 2
0 0 0 1

Therefore, since (1,0,0,0)V T = (1,0,1,0), the effect can be reconstructed from the
original OLS coefficients by adding βˆ1 and βˆ3.
Remark 4.2.11. Again, note that we could have instead chosen the matrix
R′red =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 .
We however always choose the construction that switches the first entry with one other
entry of an identity matrix and leave everything else the way it is.
The statement of Proposition 4.2.8 may seem to be generally known, obvious even.
But the existence of the matrix R that can be pulled through the OLS estimator is not
obvious.
We can now fill Table 4.2 with elements of βˆ only, yielding Table 4.3
Table 4.3: Filled in Table
X1\X2 x02 x12
x01 βˆ1 βˆ1+ βˆ3
x11 βˆ1+ βˆ2 βˆ1+ βˆ2+ βˆ3+ βˆ4
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Unbalanced Designs We now consider the general unbalanced situation. The calcu-
lations are a bit more involved. We start with a generic design matrix M together with
its reduced version X and construct the same matrices Rred and V . However, R is not
symmetric anymore and the deviation from being symmetric is measured by a diagonal
square matrix. In particular we see:
Proposition 4.2.12. For every generic design matrixM with manifest vector a there is
a matrix R that has the following properties:
1.) The product RTa switches the entries of a labeled 1 and 4, and leaves entries
labeled 2 and 3 fixed.
2.) The product RTM switches the usual first and fourth rows, and leaves the usual
second and third rows fixed.
3.) For V := XTRred(XT )−1 it holds that VMT =MTR.
4.) There is a diagonal matrix D such that RTD= R.
5.) There is a matrix V2 such that V2MT =MTD−1.
6.) The product RT y replaces the entries of a dependent variable y belonging to the
first usual row with the mean of the entries belonging to the fourth usual row and
vice versa. It further replaces the entries belonging to the second and third usual
row with their respective mean.
Note that replacing values of y that have equal rows in M with their mean does not
change the outcome of the OLS estimator, since
Lemma 4.2.13. LetM be a matrix (of full rank) with two equal rows i1 and i2, in other
wordsMi1 j =Mi2 j := M˜ j for all j and y be a vector of the same length. ThenMT y (and
hence (MTM)−1MT y) depends on the sum yi1 + yi2 but not their individual values.
Proof.
(MT y) j =∑
k
(MT ) jkyk =∑
k
Mk jyk =Mi1 jyi1 +Mi2 jyi2 + ∑
k 6=i1,i2
Mkiyk
= M˜ jyi1 + M˜ jyi2 + ∑
k 6=i1,i2
Mkiyk = (yi1 + yi2)M˜ j+ ∑
k 6=i1,i2
Mkiyk
Remark 4.2.14. Lemma 4.2.13 has an obvious generalization for l > 2 equal rows and
the same proof.
After constructing R (and RT ) below in 4.2.6, we prove Proposition 4.2.12, by
proving 6.) in Lemma 4.5.4 in the Appendix. It is easily seen, that 1.) and 2.) directly
follow from 6.). The proof of 4.) can be found in Lemma 4.5.4 as well, as both
proofs are quite technical. Finally, 3.) and 5.) follow with the same arguments as in
Proposition 4.2.8.
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Definition 4.2.15. LetM be a generic design matrix of length n and a= (a1,a2, ...,an)
its manifest vector. Let X be the corresponding reduced matrix, which is square of
dimension m< n (for now, stillm= 4). Without loss of generality we may assume that
the first n rows of M are identical to X . Otherwise we define a permutation matrix P
such that the manifest vector of PM, which is again a generic design matrix, does so.
This is always possible, because generic design matrices contain each row of X at least
once. Then we use Equation (4.2.1) and continue calculating with M′ = PM.
Let i1, i2 be the indices we intend to swap, then we can disjointly decompose the set
I := {1, ...,n} into m sets I j.
Let I j ⊂ I be the set of positions where al = j⇔ l ∈ I j for j ∈ {1,2,3,4}. In other
words, let I1 contain precisely those indices l where al = 1, and so forth.
Step 1:
Let R0 be the n by n matrix with columns r1, ...,rn. For every l ∈ Ii1 the column
rl has a 1 in every entry from Ii2 . For every l ∈ Ii2 , rl has a 1 in every entry from Ii1 .
Furthermore, for k ∈ I\{i1, i2}, for every l ∈ Ik, rl has a 1 in every entry from Ik.
This makes sure that only i1 and i2 get switched.
Note that R0 is still symmetric.
Step 2:
Divide each column ofR0 by the sum of its entries. Call the resulting non-symmetric
matrix R. We can also divide every row of R0 by the sum of its entries. Since R0 is
symmetric with non-zero row-sums, this gives us RT . In particular, by Lemma 4.5.4
there is a diagonal matrix D such that D−1RT = R= RTD.
As all the information of X is contained in the first rows ofM, we define Dtop to be the
top-left square submatrix of D of dimension m. We then defineV2 := XTDtopXT
−1 and
by the same arguments as in Proposition 4.2.8 (1.) and (2.), we have V2MT =MTD−1.
Theorem 4.2.16. V T βˆ = (MTM)−1MTRT y
Proof.
V T βˆ =V T (MTM)−1MT y= (MTM(V T )−1)−1MT y
= (MTMV T )−1MT y= (MTRTM)−1MT y
= (MTRD−1M)−1MT y= (VMTD−1M)−1MT y
= (VV2MTM)−1MT y= (MTM)−1V−12 V
−1MT y
= (MTM)−1V−12 VM
T y= (MTM)−1V−12 M
TRy
= (MTM)−1V−12 M
TD−1RT y= (MTM)−1V−12 V2M
TRT y
= (MTM)−1MTRT y
Remark 4.2.17. Note that RT is nothing but a notation. We might have just as well
defined S := RT to get a statement not including a transpose sign. The statement itself is
powerful: even in unbalanced designs, the same matrix V T as in balanced designs
leads to the linear combination necessary for determining the mean of the desired
cell. In particular:
βˆnew1 = βˆ1+ βˆ2+ βˆ3+ βˆ4
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Example 4.2.18. Consider amatrixT with themanifest vector a=(1,3,2,3,3,4,2,1)T .
Define the matrix P as
P=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
which leads to Pa= (1,2,3,4,3,3,2,1)T .
Then we have I1 = {1,8}, I2 = {2,7}, I3 = {3,5,6} and I4 = {4}.
Step 1:
The columns r1 and r8 consist of a 1 in the 4th position, and zeroes elsewhere.
The columns r2 and r7 consist of a 1 in the 2nd and 7th position.
The columns r3, r5 and r6 have a 1 in the 3rd, 5th and 6th position.
The column r4 has a 1 in the 1st and 8th position.
The matrix R0 hence looks like this:
R0 =

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

Step 2:
Divide each column by the sum of its entries to yield:
R=

0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0
0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 0
0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0

And indeed, it holds that
(PT )TR=

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
=V (PT )T ,
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and also
Ra= R(1,2,3,4,3,3,2,1)T = (4,2,3,1,3,3,2,4)T ,
which could again be interpreted as the manifest vector of the generic design matrix
(T TR)T = RTT . With the same argument as in Equation (4.2.1), we see that multiplying
PT is equivalent to multiplying Py, so we define T ′ := PT and continue our calculation.
The diagonal matrix D is
D := diag(2,1,1,1/2,1,1,1,2),
and we have R= RTD. We define the Dtop to be the top left corner submatrix of D of
dimension 4:
Dtop = diag(2,1,1,1/2)
to construct
V2 := XTDtopXT
−1
=

2 −1 −1 0.5
0 1 0 −0.5
0 0 1 −0.5
0 0 0 0.5

and indeed we have V2T ′T = T ′TD.
Two-way ANOVA with multichotomous variables
We now increase the number of categories for each variable, and later, increase the
number of variables. First of all, we need a change in notation. We still call our
variables X1 and X2. For the remainder of this section, X1 has n1 > 1 categories and X2
has n2 > 1 categories. The reference categories are x01 and x02, respectively. The other
categories are x11, ...,x
n1−1
1 and x
1
2, ...,x
n2−1
2 . We proceed in this manner mainly because
we want the reference categories to carry the index 0, and also because we want the
estimated coefficients to begin with index 1.
Again, we perform an OLS estimation with both variables and all interactions. The
number of coefficients to be estimated is hence 1 [intercept] + n1−1 [main effects X1]
+ n2−1 [main effects X2] +(n1−1)(n2−1) [interaction terms], which is
1+n1−1+n2−1+n1n2−n1−n2+1= n1n2. (4.2.4)
This is precisely the total number of cells, which is no coincidence as shown at the end
of this article in Lemma 4.5.5 in Chapter 4.5 Appendix A.
In the coefficient vector, βˆ0 denotes the intercept, βˆ1,l the coefficient belonging to cat-
egory xl1 and βˆ2,k the coefficient belonging to xk2 for all l ∈ {1, ...,n1} and k ∈ {1, ...,n2}.
The interaction term of the former two variables carries the coefficient βˆ1,l;2,k. We
emphasize at this point that we have deliberately chosen the order in which coefficients
appear. While order is not crucial here, it turns out to be important if we have more
than two variables.
We wish to fill Table 4.4
only with entries from βˆ , just like we did with Table 4.2.
We know that the top left corner is βˆ0 and there is an obvious guess for a generalization
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Table 4.4: Table of cells to be filled in
X1\X2 x02 x12 ... xn2−12
x01
x11
...
xn1−11
of the previous section which we can easily prove by the same methods as in Section
4.2.1.
For brevity, we prove, that switching from reference cell (x01,x02) to the cell (xl1,xk2) for
k, l ≥ 1 results in the sum βˆ0+ βˆ1,l + βˆ2,k+ βˆ1,l;2,k. In other words, the cell in row xl1
and column xk2 in Table 4.4 corresponds to this sum.
Since we impose an order on the variables, we also impose an order on the (reduced)
design matrix. We define as reduced design matrix the following matrix (wherein ι
denotes the intercept column)
X =

ι x11 x
2
1 ... x
n1−1
1 x
1
2 ... x
n2−1
2 x
1
1x
1
2 ... x
n1−1
1 x
n2−1
2
(x01,x
0
2)→ 1 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
(x11,x
0
2)→ 1 1 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
(x21,x
0
2)→ 1 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
...
(xn1−11 ,x
0
2)→ 1 0 0 ... 1 0 ... 0 0 ... 0
(x01,x
1
2)→ 1 0 0 ... 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 0
(x11,x
1
2)→ 1 1 0 ... 0 1 ... 0 1 ... 0
...
(xn1−11 ,x
n2−1
2 )→ 1 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 1 0 ... 1

(for more details, see the general construction in Definition 4.2.21). As shown in
Equation (4.2.4), this is a square matrix of dimension n1n2.
We wish to change variable X1 from the reference category to xl1 and variable X2 from
the reference category to xk2. In the reduced situation, this is accomplished by defining
the square matrix Rred of dimension n1n2 which switches the entries 1 and 1+n1k+ l
and looks as follows:
Rred =

0 0 0 ... 0 1 0 ... 0
0 1 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
0 0 1 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
...
0 0 0 ... 1 0 0 ... 0
1+n1k+ l→ 1 0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 ... 0 0 1 ... 0
...
0 0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... 1

Again, we defineV = XTRred(XT )−1, which is possible since X is always invertible
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(see Lemma 4.5.3) as a reduced design matrix. Again, we have
XV T = X(XTRred(XT )−1)T = XX−1RTred(X
T )T = 1RTredX = RredX ,
which is the operation on X that switches the aforementioned two rows, while keeping
the other rows constant. Furthermore
V 2 = XTRred(XT )−1XTRred(XT )−1 = XTRredRred(XT )−1 = XT (XT )−1 = 1.
In particular, row 1+ n1k+ l is the row of (xl1,xk2), meaning its product with βˆ gives
βˆ0+ βˆ1,l+ βˆ2,k+ βˆ1,l;2,k and (1,0, ...,0)V T βˆ is equal to this row.
All that remains to be shown, is that for a generic design matrix M, a matrix R can be
constructed such that RTM =MV T .
But the construction in Definition 4.2.15 is universal, in the sense that it does not depend
on the number of categories in each variable:
Given a generic design matrix M of length m ≥ n1n2 the manifest vector a now has
tuples (xc1,xd2) as entries corresponding to all cells. These entries contain the elements
of the row indexing to the left of the ‘→-arrows’ in the reduced design matrix X . We can
again decompose the manifest vector into the disjoint union of sets Ic,d corresponding
to the rows from the reduced design matrix where they appear.
In step 1, we construct a square matrix R0 of dimension m by finding its columns which
are the entries of a belonging to I0,0 and placing a 1 in every row of this vector that has
an index belonging to Il,k. We place a 1 in every column belonging to Il,k of R0 at the
row-indices belonging to I0,0. We proceed by filling in the rest corresponding to their
own columns of rows.
In step 2, we divide each column by the sum of its entries to obtain R.
Again, by construction, we haveMV T = RTM. Also, from the construction of R, we get
a diagonal matrix D such that R= RTD. We can once more define the top left diagonal
submatrix Dtop of D and define V2 := XTDtopXT
−1 which gives V2MT =MTRT . We
repeat the steps of Theorem 4.2.16 and we are done.
Proposition 4.2.19. In a dummy-coded full 2-way ANOVA with multichotomous vari-
ables, the mean of the cell with non-reference-categories (xk1,xl2) is the sum of their
interaction coefficient βˆ1,k;2,l and every coefficient in which at most these indices appear
(βˆ1,k+ βˆ2,l), plus the intercept βˆ0.
Proof. See above.
Remark 4.2.20. We can now fill in the Table 4.5 as required.
Also, the construction of Rred,V ,R0, R,D andV2 did not actually rely on the fact that
both variables assume non-reference values. The same calculations hold when one of
the variables remains in the reference category, with the results seen in the Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Complete table
X1\X2 x02 x12 ... xn2−12
x01 βˆ0 βˆ0+ βˆ2,1 ... βˆ0+ βˆ2,n2−1
x11 βˆ0+ βˆ1,1 βˆ0+ βˆ1,1+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1 ... βˆ0+ βˆ1,1+ βˆ2,n2−1+ βˆ1,1;2,n2−1
... ... ... ... ...
xn1−11 βˆ0+ βˆ1,n1−1 βˆ0+ βˆ1,n1−1+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ1,n1−1;2,1 ... βˆ0+ βˆ1,n1−1+ βˆ2,n2−1+ βˆ1,n1−1;2,n2−1
N-way ANOVA with multichotomous variables
Up to now, the results we have produced are familiar in some way or another. We now
tackle the general situation of more than two variables.
Extending the notation from the previous section, we now have N dummy-coded
variables X1, ...,XN with n1, ...,nN categories. Single categories are denoted by xqp
meaning that the variable Xp has the category q, where categories are counted from 0
to np−1.
The reference case is therefore represented by the vector (x01, ...,x0N). We now define
the reduced design matrix X for the most general case:
Definition 4.2.21. Given N dummy variables X1,...,XN with n1, ...,nN categories re-
spectively, we construct the reduced design matrix X of dimension N˜ = ∏Ni=1 ni as
follows. We first explain how to index the rows and columns. We index the rows
according to the cells. Therefore the first row is indexed with the cell (x01,x02, ...,x0n), and
the k+1-th row with cell (xk11 ,x
k2
2 , ...,x
kN
N ) where k1 := k mod n1, k2 = [(k− (k1))/n1]
mod n2, k3 = ((k− (k1))/n1− k2)/n2 mod n3 and so forth.
Sometimes we simple write (k1, ...,kN) instead of (xk11 ,x
k2
2 , ...,x
kN
N ).
We index the columns according to their position in the OLS estimator. The first col-
umn represents the intercept βˆ0, the next (n1−1)+ ...+(nN−1) columns represent the
non-reference main effects of the variables X1, ...,XN where βˆi,a is the effect of variable
Xi being in category a. These columns are indexed from left to right, i.e. starting with
categories, then the variables, i.e. βˆ1,n1−2 before βˆ1,n1−1 before βˆ2,1.
The next ∑I⊂{1,...,n},#I=2∏i∈I(ni−1) columns are the pairwise interactions of two vari-
ables XiX j represented by βˆi,a; j,b where we count up the categories b and a, then
the variables j and i. In other words βˆ1,n1−2;2,n2−2 precedes βˆ1,n1−2;2,n2−1 precedes
βˆ1,n1−1;2,1and βˆ1,n1−1;2,n2−1 precedes βˆ1,1;3,1. Continue with higher interaction terms,
by counting categories before variables, each from right to left.
Now define the entry of X in row k+1= (k1, ...,kN) and column j = βi1,a1;...,il ,al to be
1 iff for all m = 1, ..., l we have that kim = am. Define every other entry to be zero. In
particular, for the intercept βˆ0, this is a condition over the empty set, and hence always
true. Therefore the first column consists entirely of ones.
We perform a regression of a dependent variable y against all variables and all
interactions. In other words the regression model not only includes pairwise, but also
triple, quadruple , . . . , up to N-fold interactions. First of all, we determine the number
of coefficients:
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1 [intercept]
+(n1−1)+(n2−1)+ ...+(nN −1) [main effects]
+(n1−1)(n2−1)+(n1−1)(n3−1)+ ...+(n1−1)(nN −1)+ ...+(nN−1−1)(nN −1) [pairwise interactions]
+(n1−1)(n2−1)(n3−1)+ ...+(nN−2−1)(nN−1−1)(nN −1) [triple interactions]
+ ... [quadruple to (N−1)-fold interactions]
(n1−1)(n2−1)(n3−1)...(nN−2−1)(nN−1−1)(nN −1) [N-fold interactions]
= 1+
N
∑
i=1
(ni−1)+
N
∑
i> j≥1
(ni−1)(n j−1)+ ...+(n1−1)...(nN −1)
= ∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1) !=
n
∏
i=1
ni =: N˜
The proof of the last equality can be found in Lemma 4.5.5.
The reduced design matrix X is therefore a square matrix of dimension N˜, and further-
more invertible (see 4.5.3 for a proof).
We wish to reconstruct the effect of the cell (xc11 ,x
c2
2 , ...,x
cN
N ). We assume that none of
the ci are zero, hence we switch to non-reference categories for each variable. Again,
the other cases are obvious generalizations, since they require, if anything, less work.
We consider a generic design matrix M, which now has N˜ columns and m ≥ N˜ rows.
It is accompanied by a manifest vector a whose entries are N-tuples containing the
categories each row of M represents.
To switch from the reference case to (c1, ...,cN), we need to construct the matrix Rred
that switches the entries 1 and
1+n1n2...nN−2nN−1cN+n1n2...nN−2cN−1+ ...+n1n2c3+n1c2+ c1. (4.2.5)
(As can be seen in the indexing of rows in Definition 4.2.21, this exactly gives the
row of (c1, ...,cN)). We define V as the square matrix of dimension N˜ which we get
by multiplying XTRred(XT )−1. Note that this is enough to show that the mean of the
desired cell is (1,0,0,0, ...,0)V T βˆ , where (1,0,0,0, ...,0)V T has a 1 in every position
corresponding to βˆk1,ck;...;kr ,cr for k1 < ... < kr, so every coefficient in which at least one
of the categories (c1, ...,cN) appear (and the intercept). In other words:
Theorem 4.2.22. For a full N-way dummy-coded ANOVA model, the estimated mean
of a cell containing non-reference categories (c1, ...,cN) is the sum of their interaction
coefficient βˆ1,c1;2,c2;...,N,cN and every coefficient in which only those indices appear, plus
the intercept βˆ0.
Theorem 4.2.23. For a full N-way dummy-coded ANOVA model, the estimated mean
of a cell containing categories (c1, ...,cN) is the sum of their non-reference-interaction
coefficient βˆ(k,ck)ck 6=0 and every coefficient in which only those indices appear, plus the
intercept βˆ0.
We prove the first theorem, the second is an exercise left to the reader. All that
needs to change is the index which is to be swapped against 1, which can be determined
by Equation (4.2.5).
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Proof. All that remains is to construct the matrix R such that VMT =MTR and repeat
the usual calculation. Again, we can construct the matrices R0 and R with the same
methods as in Definition 4.2.15. Decompose the manifest vector a into subsets Ii1,i2,...,iN
each corresponding to all the possible entries in a. This time, in the first step identify
the entries which belong to I0,0,...,0 and Ic1,...,cN , in the I0,0,...,0-columns place a 1 in the
Ic1,...,cN -rows and vice versa, finally for all other indices Iv place a 1 in the Iv rows of
the Iv columns. Call this matrix R0, divide the columns by the sum of their entries
and call this matrix R. By construction, VMT =MTR, and we continue with the usual
constructions ofD andV2 to getV2MT =MTD−1. The rest follows just like in Theorem
4.2.16.
We now present an example with three variables with two, three and two categories,
respectively.
Example 4.2.24. Consider the three dummy-coded variables X1,X2,X3 with categories
x01,x
1
1,x
0
2,x
1
2,x
2
2,x
0
3 and x13. The reduced design matrix X is a square matrix of dimension
12 and has the form:
category
(0,0,0)
(1,0,0)
(0,1,0)
(1,1,0)
(0,2,0)
(1,2,0)
(0,0,1)
(1,0,1)
(0,1,1)
(1,1,1)
(0,2,1)
(1,2,1)

βˆ0 βˆ1,1 βˆ2,1 βˆ2,2 βˆ3,1 βˆ1,1;2,1 βˆ1,1;2,2 βˆ1,1;3,1 βˆ2,1;3,1 βˆ2,2;3,1 βˆ1,1;2,1;3,1 βˆ1,1;2,2;3,1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1

If we wish to obtain the cell mean of (x11,x12,x13), we need to construct the Rred matrix
that swaps the rows 1 and
1+n1n2c3+n1c2+ c1 = 1+2 ·3 ·1+2 ·1+1= 1+6+2+1= 10
which looks like this:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

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We define V = XTRred(XT )−1 which is
V =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −2 −1
1 −1 0 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −2 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 −1 −1 0 1 1 1 1 1 −2 −1
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 2 1 1 1 1 −2 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 2 1 1 −2 −1
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 2 1 −2 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

and finally we can confirm
(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)V T = (1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0),
multiplied with βˆ gives us
βˆ0+ βˆ1,1+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1+ βˆ1,1;3,1+ βˆ2,1;3,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,1, (4.2.6)
confirming the statement of Theorem 4.2.22 for this example.
For reasons that we explain in the next section, we also consider the switch from the
reference cell to (x01,x12,x13), which is achieved by switching the first entry and entry
number
1+n1n2c3+n1c2+ c1 = 1+2 ·3 ·1+2 ·1+0= 1+6+2= 9.
The result is
βˆ0+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,1+ βˆ2,1;3,1, (4.2.7)
confirming Theorem 4.2.23. Note that the coefficients from Equation (4.2.7) also
appear in Equation (4.2.6), and are precisely those which do not contain (1,1) in their
index.
4.2.2 Derivation of null hypotheses
Based on Theorems 4.2.22 and 4.2.23, we now derive null hypotheses for a specific
question. Let us compare the performance of several methods given certain circum-
stances, for example the times different cars drive to complete different tracks under
different weather conditions, or the solution quality of different algorithms depending
on the ‘difficulty’ of the input. Furthermore, assume that a full ANOVA model is pre-
ferred to nested smaller models on the basis of F-tests referring to subsets of coefficients
Greene (1993). Our goal is by means of the two theorems to bring order to the ‘wall of
coefficients’ βˆ .
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the categories of first independent variable
are different methods. We denote this variable by P1 instead of X1 and call it the
primary variable. We want to compare the reference category (p01) of the primary vari-
able, which we call our own category, to the first non-reference-category (p11), which
we call competitor category. This comparison takes place across all cells. All the other
independent variables are called secondary variables and are indexed by S2, ...,SN with
categories (s ji ). We call the dependent variable y the performance variable.
Null Hypotheses on Two Cell Means
We start by comparing means of two cells containing secondary variables
(sc22 ,s
c3
3 , ...,s
cN
N ) in non-reference-categories, i.e., ck 6= 0 ∀k. From Theorem 4.2.22,
we know that the mean of the cell with these values of the secondary variables and the
competitor category for the primary variables is given by the sum of all coefficients
which hold only these indices (c1 = 1,c2,c3, ..,cN). By Theorem 4.2.23 the mean of
the cell with the same values for the secondary variables and the own category for the
primary variable is given by the sum of all coefficients holding only these indices except
the first, which are (c2,c3, ..,cN). To compare the performance of these two methods,
we specify the null hypothesis that these two cell means are equal, or in other words
that their difference is zero. As the set of all coefficients of our own category is a
subset of the coefficients of the competitor category, this difference equals the sum of
all coefficients whose index c1 equals 1.
In a more general situation some secondary variables are in the reference category,
while others are not. Theorem 4.2.23 now tells us, that the mean of a cell containing
the competitor category is the sum of all coefficients that only contain indices of the
non-reference-categories. From Theorem 4.2.23 we further know that the mean of a
cell containing the competitor category the is the same as explained in the previous
paragraph. The null hypothesis implies that the difference of the two cell means is zero.
This difference is the sum of coefficients whose index c1 equals 1 and of coefficients
with non-reference category indices.
Example 4.2.25. Remember Example 4.2.24. Herein define X1 to be the primary
category P1 and X2,X3 to be S2 and S3. Let us again look at (s12,s13). As seen in
Equation (4.2.6), the competitor effect is
βˆ0+ βˆ1,1+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1+ βˆ1,1;3,1+ βˆ2,1;3,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,1,
while our own effect is
βˆ0+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,1+ βˆ2,1;3,1.
Their difference is hence
βˆ1,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1+ βˆ1,1;3,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,1
which is exactly the sum of those coefficients that contain index c1 = 1 and the other
non-reference-categories. Again, the intercepts cancel out.
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4.2.3 Complete Null Hypothesis
We now wish to investigate total effects. To this end we compare the means of all
cells containing the own category to the means of cells containing categories of all
competitors. This can be achieved by simply adding up the means of individual cells.
Alternatively, one could add all cell means containing the competitor category on one
side, and add up all cell means containing the own category on the other side. Then the
null hypothesis implies the equality of these two sums.
The main work has already been done. From Section 4.2.2, we know that all the terms
appearing in the null hypotheses must carry the index c1 = 1. All that remains is to to
determine the weight of each term in the linear combination representing the hypothesis.
Every coefficient with c1 = 1 symbolized as βˆ1,1;k1,ck1 ;...;kr ,ckr describes its own cell
it appears in while all the other variables are in the reference category. Coefficient
βˆ1,1;k1,ck1 ;...;kr ,ckr appears once in the cell
(p11,s
0
2, ...,s
0
k1−1,s
ck1
k1
,s0k1+1, ...,s
0
kr−1,s
ckr
kr ,s
0
kr+1, ...,s
0
N)
But such a coefficient also appears in each cell in which additional secondary
variables are ‘raised’ from the reference category to a non-reference category:
(p11,s
0
2, ...,s
1
k1−1,s
ck1
k1
,s1k1+1, ...,s
1
kr−1,s
ckr
kr ,s
0
kr+1, ...,s
1
N).
Therefore such a coefficient will also appear as many times, as there are ‘higher’
options across all reference categories contained in its index. Let I be the set of indices
which are in their reference category, i.e., which aren’t (k1, ...,kr). The total number of
appearances of each c1 = 1 coefficient therefore is:
1 [its own category]
+∑
i∈I
(ni−1) [a change in 1 variable Xi]
+ ∑
i> j∈I
(ni−1)(n j−1) [changing 2]
+ ∑
i> j>k∈I
(ni−1)(n j−1)(nk−1) [changing 3]
+ ... changing 4 and up to #I−1 variables
+∏
i∈I
(ni−1) [changing all variables belonging to I]
= ∑
J⊂I
∏
j∈J
(n j−1) =∏
i∈I
ni
as can be seen in Lemma 4.5.5.
Consequently the total number of appearances of such a coefficient equals the product
of the number of categories for the variables which according to the coefficient are in
the reference category.
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4.3 Application
The data for this example is taken from Gahler and Hruschka (2018a).
In Gahler and Hruschka (2018a), four procedures for allocating advertising budgets
are compared by means of a simulation study. Two primary variables were considered
independently, though we will only focus on one, the obtained returns after 40 periods.
Furthermore, five secondary variables (functional form of the response function, dis-
turbance level, saturation level, elasticity level and budget level) were considered, but,
for brevity, we will consider only a subset of this data.
Most accurately, the following factor levels were eliminated: The third rule of thumb
(ROT) in the primary variable, the multiplicative- and ADBUDG-response functions,
the ‘similar’ saturation level and the low budget level.
This leaves us with three levels in the primary variable (the described algorithm and the
first two rules of thumb), a secondary variable with two factor-levels (similar and varied
elasticity levels) and a secondary variable with three factor-levels (three disturbance
levels). Stated differently, we have
X1 = P1 = Procedures : (p01 = ‘algorithm’, p11 = ‘first ROT’, p21 = ‘second ROT’,)
X2 = S2 = Elasticities : (s02 = ‘similar’,s12 = ‘varied’)
X3 = S3 = Disturbances : (s03 = ‘low’,s13 = ‘moderate’,s23 = ‘high’)
The correspondingmain-effect- (PUR1), pairwise-interaction- (PAIR1), and full-interaction-
regression FULL1 models have respective R2-values of 0.31, 0.58 and 0.65, indicating
that the full interaction model is the best for explaining variance. Furthermore, the
F-test conducted via anova(PUR1,PAIR1,FULL1)
confirms that the full model is to be preferred to its two nested models, with p-values
beyond 10−10.
Note that this is a property that holds for the entire dataset with all six variables and
sextuple interactions. We obtain our coefficient vector through summary(FULL1)
If we want, for example, to determine the effects of the algorithm and the first rule
of thumb with varied elasticities in and high disturbances, these effects are represented
by means of cells (p01,s12,s23) and (p11,s12,s23), respectively. By Theorems 4.2.23 and
4.2.22, the former equals the sum of all coefficients holding indices (2,1) and (3,2), and
the latter equals the sum of all coefficients holding indices (1,1), (2,1) and (3,2). Then
the null hypothesis is:
βˆ0+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,2+ βˆ2,1;3,2= βˆ0+ βˆ1,1+ βˆ2,1+ βˆ3,2+ βˆ1,1;2,1+ βˆ1,1;3,2+ βˆ2,1;3,2+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,2
which is equivalent to the difference being zero, and confirming the result of Section
4.2.2, only coefficients remain whose index c1 equals 1 (symbolized by 1,1):
βˆ1,1+ βˆ1,1;2,1+ βˆ1,1;3,2+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,2 = 0.
Calculating the right hand side gives a value of
−0.0212−0.0199+0.0050+0.0164=−0.0197, implying that the algorithm
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Table 4.6: summary(FULL1)
Coefficient Description OLS Estimate
βˆ0 Intercept 0.97678
βˆ1,1 first ROT -0.0212
βˆ1,2 second ROT 0.0156
βˆ2,1 varied -0.0303
βˆ3,1 moderate -0.0119
βˆ3,2 high -0.0291
βˆ1,1;2,1 first ROT:varied -0.0199
βˆ1,2;2,1 second ROT:varied -0.0096
βˆ1,1;3,1 first ROT:moderate -0.0036
βˆ1,2;3,1 second ROT:moderate -0.0149
βˆ1,1;3,2 first ROT:high 0.0050
βˆ1,2;3,2 second ROT:high -0.1031
βˆ2,1;3,1 varied:moderate 0.0047
βˆ2,1;3,2 varied:high 0.0100
βˆ1,1;2,1;3,1 first ROT:varied:moderate 0.0175
βˆ1,2;2,1;3,1 second ROT:varied:moderate -0.0595
βˆ1,1;2,1;3,2 first ROT:varied:high 0.0164
βˆ1,2;2,1;3,2 second ROT:varied:high -0.3024
has higher returns than the ROT. The F-test on the linear restriction defined by vector
v = (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0) gives a p-value > 0.4 Greene (1993),
signalling that they are not significantly higher.
Interpretation is straightforward: Under the condition tested(varied elasticities and
high disturbances) we cannot conclude that the algorithm yields higher sales than the
first ROT.
Now for the main question: Does one procedure outperform the other overall?
The triple interaction term βˆ1,1;2,1;3,2 appears only in its own right, representing the
secondary categories (s12,s23) and hence has a weight of 1.
The term βˆ1,1;3,2 appears in its own cell as it represents category (s23), but also appears
in cell (s12,s23) and hence has a weight of 2.
Likewise, βˆ1,1;2,1 appears in its own cell as well as in cells (s12,s23) and (s12,s13), and
hence has a weight of 3.
Finally, βˆ1,1 appears in its own cell and 5 more cases, leading to a weight of 6. Note
that these results are in agreement with Section 4.2.3. There we show that we only
have to consider coefficients having 1,1 in the subscript. We also demonstrate in this
section that the weight of such a coefficient corresponds to the product of the number
of categories for the reference categories indicated by this coefficient.
The null hypothesis comparing the two procedures is represented by
v′ = (0,6,0,0,0,0,3,0,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,1,0)
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which holds the weight explained and leads to
6 βˆ1,1+3 βˆ1,1;2,1+2 βˆ1,1;3,2+ βˆ1,1;2,1;3,2 = 0
The left hand side of this expression sums up to -0.161. The F-test on the linear
restriction defined by vector v′ results in a p-value p< 0.05 which confirms that overall
the algorithm outperforms the first rule of thumb.
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4.4 Conclusion
The developed method allows researchers to use full ANOVA models with many in-
dependent variables in different application areas if interest focuses on the effects of
categories of one selected independent variable. Full ANOVA models are appropriate
if highest-order interactions are significant and of considerable size. The method might
be extended in at least three respects.
Firstly, it could be adapted to ANOVAmodels with many variables which contain some,
but not all higher interactions terms.
The second possible extension is connected with the fact that the method is restricted
to categorical variables. How to deal with continuous variables and their interactions
is another interesting, albeit challenging research question.
Thirdly, we know from Lemma 4.5.6 that the results presented only have a well defined
OLS-estimator if the design matrix contains every possible row. If it does not, several
actions for adjustment may be taken, from increasing the sample size, over merging
categories to eliminating entire variables. But perhaps there is a mathematical approach
yet to be found for the case of ill-defined OLS-estimators that still gives us the correct
linear combinations of coefficients.
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4.5 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 4.5.1. Some linear algebra frequently used:
1.) For m,n,k ∈ N+ let A be a m by n matrix and B be an n by k matrix, then
(AB)T = BTAT .
2.) Let A be an invertible matrix, then (AT )−1 = (A−1)T .
3.) Let A,B be invertible matrices of the same dimension. Then (AB)−1 = B−1A−1.
4.) Let P be a permutation matrix. Then P is orthogonal, i.e. PT = P−1.
Proof. All taken from Abadir and Magnus (2005)
1.) Abadir and Magnus (2005) P.26, Ex.2.15 (a)
2.) Abadir and Magnus (2005) P.26, Ex.2.15 (c)
3.) Abadir and Magnus (2005) P.26, Ex.2.15 (d)
4.) Abadir and Magnus (2005) P.32, Ex.2.29 (d)
Lemma 4.5.2. Let R,V,X be as in Proposition 4.2.2. Then V is its own inverse and V
(and its transpose) and R uniquely solve the equations
VXT = XTR (4.5.1)
RTX = XV T (4.5.2)
Proof. The second equation follows from the first, since
RTX = ((RTX)T )T = (XTR)T = (VXT )T = XV T . (4.5.3)
As XT is invertible, the unique solution isV = XTR(XT )−1, which is exactly the matrix
we defined as V in Section 4.2.1, and finally
V 2 = XTR(XT )−1XTR(XT )−1 = XTRR(XT )−1 = XT (XT )−1 = 1. (4.5.4)
The same calculations go through in the later sections withV and Rred, since Rred is
symmetric and orthogonal.
Lemma 4.5.3. Let X be a reduced design matrix. Then X has full rank, and is hence,
invertible.
4.5. APPENDIX A: PROOFS 97
Proof. The way we constructed the matrix X columnwise, the first 1 that appears is in
the first row where it is measured (though there might be more 1s below). Up to this
point, counting from top to bottom, this is the last non-zero entry in the row it appears
in, as a 1 to the right of it would represent a higher interaction effect in which it appears.
We can therefore define a permutation matrix P which, multiplied by X gives X ′ = PX
as a lower triangular matrix with 1s on the main diagonal and only zeroes to the right of
this diagonal. We know that the determinant of a lower triangular matrix is the product
of its diagonal entries, hence det(X ′) = 1. We know furthermore, that the determinant
of a permutation matrix is its sign, hence det(P) ∈ {−1,1}. We can therefore conclude
det(X) = det(P−1X ′) = det(P−1)det(X ′) =
1
det(P)
∈ {−1,1}. (4.5.5)
In particular, det(X) 6= 0 and therefore X is invertible and has full rank.
Lemma 4.5.4. Let R0,R be as in the two construction steps throughout Section 4.2.1.
For indexing reasons, we write Φ instead of R0.
AsΦ is symmetric, vi :=∑nk=1Φik =∑nk=1Φki and the thereby defined vector v contains
the row-wise (and column-wise) sums of entries of Φ.
1.) Φ has the following property:
for all i, j ∈ 1, ...,n :Φi j∑
l
Φ jl
vl
=Φi j
v j
vi
. (4.5.6)
2.) There is a diagonal matrix D such that RTD= R.
3.) It further holds that D−1RT = R.
4.) The product RT y replaces the entries of a dependent variable y belonging to the
first usual row with the mean of the entries belonging to the fourth usual row and
vice versa. It further replaces the entries belonging to the second and third usual
row with their respective mean.
Proof. 1.) Φ is symmetricwith entries in {0,1}, so the statement is trivial forΦi j = 0.
Now let Φi j = 1. By construction (see step 1) this can mean one of three things:
a) i ∈ Ii1 , j ∈ Ii2
b) j ∈ Ii1 , i ∈ Ii2
c) ∃k ∈ I\{i1, i2}, i, j ∈ Ik
We begin with the simple situation c).
Let k be such that i1 6= k 6= i2 and i, j ∈ Ik. In particular, this means that
vi = v j = #Ik. Furthermore, for every l such that Φ jl 6= 0,vl = v j, therefore
∑
l
Φ jl
vl
=
1
v j
∑
l
Φ jl =
1
v j
v j = 1=
v j
vi
. (4.5.7)
We nowprove the statement for a), and b) follows immediately, since the statement
is symmetric in i, j and i1, i2.
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Given i1, i2, let i ∈ Ii1 , j ∈ Ii2 , such that Φi j 6= 0. As column j has a 1 in every
entry from Ii1 , we know that v j = #Ii1 . This happens in every row l with l ∈ Ii1 ,
therefore in these rows (and hence also row i) the sum of entries is vl = #Ii2 and
hence
∑
l
Φ jl
vl
=
1
#Ii2
∑
l
Φ jl =
#Ii1
#Ii2
=
v j
vi
. (4.5.8)
Note, that the equation ∑l
Φ jl
vl
=
v j
vi
does not hold in general! But it does hold
for i, j such that Φi j = 1, which is exactly what we have shown. Therefore the
equation Φi j∑l
Φ jl
vl
=Φi j
v j
vi
does hold for all i and j.
2.) Define ∆ to be the diagonal matrix containing the elements of v in order, i.e.:
∆i j =
{
vi if i= j
0 else
(4.5.9)
By construction, we know that R=Φ∆−1 and RT = (Φ∆−1)T = ∆−1Φ.
We now define ηi := 1/(∑nk=1Rik) = 1/(∑
n
k=1R
T
ki) to be the inverse of the row-
wise sum of R, which is the same as the inverse of the column-wise sum of RT .
We further set D to be the diagonal matrix containing the elements of η in order,
i.e.:
Di j =
{
ηi if i= j
0 else
(4.5.10)
We need to prove RTD= R by showing that their entries are equal:
(RTD)i j =∑
k
RTikDk j (4.5.11)
=∑
k
RkiDk j (4.5.12)
= R jiD j j (4.5.13)
= (Φ∆−1) jiη j (4.5.14)
=∑
k
Φ jk∆−1ki
1
∑l R jl
(4.5.15)
=Φ ji∆−1ii
1
∑l(Φ∆−1) jl
(4.5.16)
=
Φ ji
vi
1
∑l(∑kΦ jk∆−1kl )
(4.5.17)
=
Φ ji
vi
1
∑lΦ jl∆−1ll
(4.5.18)
=
Φ ji
vi
1
∑l
Φ jl
vl
(4.5.19)
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Remember from Equation (4.5.6) that Φi j∑l
Φ jl
vl
= Φi j
v j
vi
. We can therefore
conclude:
Φ ji
vi
1
∑l
Φ jl
vl
(4.5.6)
=
Φ ji
vi
1
v j
vi
(4.5.20)
=
Φ ji
vi
vi
v j
(4.5.21)
=
Φ ji
v j
(4.5.22)
and conversely
Ri j = (Φ∆−1)i j (4.5.23)
=∑
k
Φik∆−1k j (4.5.24)
=Φi j∆−1j j (4.5.25)
= 1/v jΦi j =
Φi j
v j
(4.5.26)
=
Φ ji
vi
above
= (RTD)i j (4.5.27)
and therefore R= RTD.
3.)
D−1RT = D−1(RTD)T = D−1DT (RT )T = D−1DR= R (4.5.28)
4.) Remember the definitions of I1, I4 and keep in mind RT = ∆−1Φ.
Now, for every index l ∈ I1 we have
(RT y)l = (∆−1Φy)l =∑
k∈I
(∆−1Φ)lkyk =∑
k∈I
(∑
h
∆−1lh Φhk)yk = (4.5.29)
=∑
k∈I
(∆−1ll Φlk)yk =∑
k∈I
Φlk
vl
yk. (4.5.30)
Since l ∈ I1, by construction, Φlk = 1 ⇐⇒ k ∈ I4, and otherwise Φlk = 0, and
therefore vl = #I4 and
∑
k∈I
Φlk
vl
yk = ∑
k∈I4
Φlk
vl
yk = ∑
k∈I4
yk
#I4
, (4.5.31)
which is precisely the mean of entries of y belonging to I4. The other parts of the
statement follow analogously.
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Lemma 4.5.5.
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1) =
N
∏
i=1
ni (4.5.32)
Proof. By complete induction on N.
Basis: N = 2 : {1,2} has 4 subsets: /0,{1},{2} and {1,2}. Remember that the product
over an empty index set is 1. Then we have
∑
I⊆{1,2}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1) =∏
i∈ /0
(ni−1)+ ∏
i∈{1}
(ni−1)+ ∏
i∈{2}
(ni−1)+ ∏
i∈{1,2}
(ni−1)
(4.5.33)
= 1+(n1−1)+(n2−1)+(n1−1)(n2−1) = n1n2, (4.5.34)
where the last equality was already seen in Equation (4.2.4)
Step: N−1→ N
Let the statement be known for N−1. We split the index set into those that contain 1
and those that do not, and then use the induction step on both sets.
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1) = ∑
1∈I⊆{1,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1)+ ∑
1/∈I⊆{1,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1) (4.5.35)
= (n1−1) ∑
1∈I⊆{1,...,N}
∏
i∈I,i6=1
(ni−1))+ ∑
I⊆{2,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1)
(4.5.36)
= (n1−1) ∑
I∪{1},I⊆{2,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1)+
N
∏
i=2
ni (4.5.37)
= (n1−1) ∑
I⊆{2,...,N}
∏
i∈I
(ni−1)+
N
∏
i=2
ni (4.5.38)
= (n1−1)
N
∏
i=2
ni+
N
∏
i=2
ni =
N
∏
i=1
ni (4.5.39)
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Lemma 4.5.6. Let X be a reduced design matrix of dimension N˜ and letM be anm× N˜
matrix consisting of the rows of X . ThenMTM is invertible if and only ifM is a generic
design matrix (i.e. M contains every row of X at least once).
Proof. ‘⇐’ Let M be a generic design matrix. Since every row of X appears as a row
in M, we can find an m×m permutation matrix P such that the first N˜ rows of PM are
the exact rows of X in order. Since X is invertible by Lemma 4.5.3, X has rank N˜ and
so does PM. Since permuting rows does not change the rank (see Greene (1993) P.
18-19 2-43 & 2-45), M has full rank N˜ as well. Therefore, MTM is a square matrix of
dimension N˜ with rank N˜ (see Greene (1993) P. 19 2-46) and hence invertible.
‘⇒’ By contraposition. Assume that M is not a generic design matrix. Then there is a
row of X which does not appear in M.
We will first show that M does not have rank N˜, so without loss of generality, we may
assume thatM has at least N˜ rows. If it has fewer, that particular statement must already
be true.
So let the length of M be at least N˜. Define a permutation matrix P such that all the
unique rows of M are in the first N˜ rows. As there is a row of X that now does not
appear in the first N˜ rows of PM, at least one of them must appear twice, since M only
consists of rows of X . As all rows below row N˜ are non-unique, PM has at most N˜-1
unique rows, and hence rank(PM) < N˜. Again, the same holds for M, as permutations
do not change the rank.
Finally, MTM is a square matrix of dimension N˜ with rank < N˜ and hence cannot be
invertible.
In particular, all OLS-estimators appearing in this article are well-defined.
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4.6 Appendix B: Further Comments
In this section we give further explanations to Definition 4.2.21 and the proofs of
Theorem 4.2.16, Lemma 4.5.3, 4.5.4 and 4.5.5. It was originally intended as an
audioscript for a journal and is supposed to facilitate the the individual steps of the
definition and the proofs. It is therefore written in very plain terms, as the formal
versions are already written above, in the corresponding sections.
Definition 4.2.21 We now define the generic design matrix in its most general form.
Note that this definition is a generalization of Definition 4.2.4 and is just the general
definition of a designmatrix for dummy-coded variables, in which each case appears
exactly once.
It can be helpful to compare this construction to the matrix from Example 4.2.24
In Lemma 4.5.5 in 4.5 Appendix A, we will prove that it is a square matrix, and in
Lemma 4.5.3 we will prove that it is always invertible.
We start with N dummy-coded variables, which we call X1,..., XN , and each of these
can take only one of a finite number of states. We call these states the categories, so
for Xi, we say it has ni categories. The total number of categories is N˜, which is the
product over all cardinalities of categories. Therefore, this will be the number of rows
and columns of the reduced design matrix.
We will index the rows by the cells, and the columns by the coefficients.
So for every row, the row index will be the vector of the cases each variable is in,
written as xkii . This superscript is just a notation, not an exponent, and signifies, just
like before, that variable xi takes the category ki.
For understanding the indexing of the rows, it is useful to keep the example in mind,
where the number of categories of each variable is 10. That way, the superscript in
sequence represent the digits of a decimal integer in reverse order. That number will
be k in row number k+1. In row one, this number will be zero, so the row index has
a zero in every superscript. In row 2, the first variable will take the first non-reference
category, and all others will be zero, so the superscripts will be 1 followed by zeroes,
which is k = 0...0001= 1 in reverse, since k+1= 2.
In the decimal system, to get the least significant digit of a number, we take the
remainder modulo 10. For the second least significant digit, we subtract the least sig-
nificant from the number, divide by 10, and again take the remainder modulo 10.
We use this very construction to index the rows. In row k+ 1, the category of x1
will just be k modulo the size of the variable, hence modulo n1. For the next variable,
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we subtract the previous term and divide by n1, then take the remainder mod n2. We
continue this process for all variables. Keeping this construction in mind will be very
helpful later on for identifying the correct rows for all cases.
We now construct the columns. Every column will be indexed as the Greek letter
beta with the configuration of all variables that are not in the reference category in
the subscript. In the first column, representing the intercept, all variables are in their
reference category, so we denote that simply by β0.
The columns are indexed from left to right by number of variables per interaction
term, starting with 0, where we have the intercept. Next, with one variable, so just the
main effects, we start counting up the non-reference categories of the first variable X1
which will be β1,1 up to β1,n1−1. For the main effects, the beta-subscript is (i, j) for
the main effect of Xi in non-reference category x ji . The general subscript notation is as
follows: k1, t1;k2, t2; ...;kl , tl is the subscript of an interaction of l variables Xk1 , ...,Xkl
which are in the non-reference-categories xt1k1 , ...,x
tl
kl
.
They are arranged from left to right in N+1 clusters of coefficients with the same
number l of interacting variables. Within each cluster they are sorted by variables, so
cluster l is divided into subclusters indexed (k1, ...,kl)which are sortedwithin the cluster
l by incrementing from left to right. Within the subcluster (k1, ...,kl), the coefficients
are sorted by incrementing the categories (t1, ..., tl) from left to right.
We have now indexed the rows of the matrix by cases, and the columns by coeffi-
cients.
All that’s left to be done is fill the matrix with values. We do so by simply assigning
a 1 to each pair (k+1, j) of row k+1= (k1, ...,kN) and column j = β(i1,a1;...,il ,al) when
all the categories that appear in the β -subscript are met by the cases in the columns.
So for each pair (ip,ap) in the subscript of β , we want that the variable Xip takes the
category ap, which means that the row index contains the term x
ap
ip . If this is true for
all categories appearing in the subscript of beta, the entry of the matrix X in row k+1
and column j will contain a 1, and if not, a 0.
We then calculate the number of coefficients, and we see with the help of Lemma
4.5.5 from the 4.5 Appendix A that that is equal to the number of rows, and hence
square, and it will be invertible which is proven in Lemma 4.5.3.
Theorem 4.2.16 In this theorem we condense all the work we have done previously
in order to get the result we need. We are in the case of 2 variables with 2 cases each,
and a generic design matrix M.
The claim is, that the permutation matrix RT , which changes the reference case in
both variables, can be pulled through the OLS estimator, and comes out on the other end
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asV T . This means that the effect of the two non-reference categories can be determined
by multiplying V T with the original OLS estimator.
It is a generalization of Proposition 4.2.8, which itself is a generalization of Propo-
sition 4.2.2. Therefore, if there are problems with certain steps, we recommend analyz-
ing the proofs of those propositions. Furthermore we use Proposition 4.2.12, which is
mainly proven with the help of Lemma 4.5.4 in 4.5 Appendix A.
We also use some linear algebra, found in Lemma 4.5.1 of 4.5 Appendix A. This is,
however, elementary, as it is simply the transpose and inverse of a product of matrices,
and the inverse of the transpose.
Now, for the proof.
We start with the left hand side, and in the first step we write out the OLS ofM with
y. AsV T is invertible, we can pull its inverse into the inverse product, on the right hand
side. This is easier seen by going backwards, as the inverse of a product is the product
of the inverses in switched order.
Going to the next line, we know from Lemma 4.5.2 that V 2 is the identity matrix,
so V is its own inverse, and hence, V T is its own inverse as well. The next step is a
consequence of Proposition 4.2.12.3), we get from transposing this equation, that RTM
is equal to MV T .
To the next line, we know from Proposition 4.2.12.4) that there is a diagonal matrix
such that R = RTD, or equivalently, RT = RD−1. Again, we call pull R through MT ,
and receive V on the other side.
To the next line, we know from Proposition 4.2.12.5) that there is a matrix V2
such that MTD−1 = V2MT . Both V and V2 are invertible, so we can pull them out of
the left side of the bracket, bymultiplying their inverses from the right side of the bracket.
To the next line, V is its own inverse, and can be pulled through MT as R.
To the next line, R can be written asD−1RT , andD−1 can bee pulled BACK through
MT as V2, as seen before. Finally, V2 and its inverse cancel out, and we get the desired
term.
Lemma 4.5.3 To understand this proof it is absolutely necessary to understand the
construction of X , i.e. Definition 4.2.21.
It is again helpful to look at the matrix in Example 4.2.24.
A reformulation of the proof is the following. Take any column. Want to show that
the first "1" that it appears in will be in the row in which it is the last one. So if you
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follow down any column to its first appearing "1", there will only be zeroes to the right
of that particular "1".
Why is that true, and how does that help us?
It is obviously true for the intercept column: the very first entry is a "1", represent-
ing the reference case in every variable. Therefore in this row, no non-reference cases
appear. Naturally that means that there can’t be another column containing a "1" in
this row, because for every other column there is a one in each row of the designated
non-reference-cases. But those simply do not exist in the first row, where all variables
are in the reference category.
Now, take any column indexed by βi1,a1;...,il ,al . In this column, there is a "1" in
exactly those rows (xk11 , ...,x
kN
N ), where kim = aim for all m = 1, ..., l, so in every non-
reference case described by the beta subscript. The very first appearance is the one
where all non-specified cases are zero, i.e.
(x01, ...,x
0
i1−1,x
a1
i1
,x0i1+1, ....,x
0
il−1,x
al
il
,x0il+1, ...,x
0
N)
in the shorter version, the row index is
(0, ...,0,a1,0, ...,0,al ,0, ...,0)
.
We show by contradiction that there is no further 1 to the right of it:
Assume that there is another 1 to the right of it. Because of the ordering imposed
on the columns in the definition this can mean that either the pre-specified variables
are in a different category (which is impossible, because they are in the row with the
pre-specified values) or that another variable is raised from a reference category into a
non-reference category (which is impossible too, since by Definition 4.2.21 a "1" means
that all non-reference-categories that appear in the beta-subscript must be in these cases
in the corresponding row, but these are all zero), or both, which is impossible for both
of the previous reasons.
Define a permutation as follows: for every column i= 1, ...,N let p(i) be the row in
which the first "1" appears. Because of the previous reasoning, this is a well-defined,
bĳective map from {1, ...,N} to itself, hence a permutation. We then send row p(i) to
row i [i.e. we define the inverse permutation] and multiply the corresponding permu-
tation matrix P with X , so for every column i, the first appearing "1" will be in row i
instead of row p(i). In other words, it will be on the diagonal. As we only changed the
rows on their own, they will keep the property that this (now diagonal) "1" is the last
non-zero entry. So to the right of the diagonal there can only be zeroes. Therefore it is
a lower triangular matrix with "1" in every diagonal entry.
The rest of the proof is trivial.
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Lemma 4.5.4 To understand this Lemma it is imperative to precisely follow the con-
struction of R0 and R, so here is a quick recap. M is a generic design matrix of length n
and a= (a1, ...,an) is its manifest vector. All numbers that appear in a are the numbers
1, 2, 3 and 4, each in its position corresponding to the usual rows of X inM. We define
the four sets I1, I2, I3 and I4, where I j contains precisely those indices from 1 to n whose
positions in the manifest vector are j.
R0 and R are constructed such that the product Ra leaves the 2- and 3-positions
constant, and changes the 1- and 4-positions.
For every column rl , if l is in I2 or I3, there will be ones in precisely those rows
whose indices appear in I2 or I3 respectively. If l is in I1, it will have ones in those
rows whose indices appear in I4 and vice versa. We now call this matrixΦ, because the
subscript 0 of R0 would make things more complicated than necessary.
We prove the first part of the proposition. Lemma 4.5.4 is proven for the general
situation, but we can just as well call i1 = 1 and i2 = 4 and these are the indices which
we want to swap.
Now, vi is defined as the sum of entries of row i of Φ, and since Φ is symmetric,
it is equal to the sum of entries in column i. By construction of Φ, every entry of v is
non-zero.
We start with 1.c). Without loss of generality we say k= 2, so i, j are in I2. Therefore
the sum of elements of row i and likewise j is the cardinality of I2, because precisely
that many "1’s" appear in these rows and columns. And that further holds for every l
in I2. The denominator is hence constant and independent of the summation index, and
can be factored out. All other appearing terms are equal to the cardinality of I2, and
cancel out.
It remains to show a), so assume i is in I1 and j is in I4, andΦi j is 1. By construction,
column j has a 1 in every row belonging to I1 so v j = #I1. Likewise, every row l be-
longing to I4 has a 1 in every column from I1 so vl = #I4. The rest is just as in the formula.
Part 2 is a long construction, but a straightforward proof, therefore comments will
be on every new "="-sign.
1.) Definition of matrix multiplication
2.) Definition of the transpose
3.) Dk j = 0 unless k = j, so only the k = j-case remains
4.) Construction of R by dividing Φ by ∆, also definition of D j j
5.) Definition of matrix multiplication, also definition of η j
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6.) ∆ki = 0 unless k = i, so only the k = i-case remains, also construction of R by
dividing Φ by ∆
7.) Definition of ∆ii, also definition of matrix multiplication
8.) ∆kl = 0 unless k = l, so only the k = l-case remains
9.) Definition of ∆ll
10.) Part 1 of the proposition
11.) Inverse fraction
12.) Cancellation
and conversely
1.) Construction of R by dividing Φ by ∆
2.) Definition of matrix multiplication
3.) ∆k j = 0 unless k = j so only the k = j-case remains
4.) Definition of ∆ j j
5.) Pulling Φ into the numerator
6.) Φ is symmetric
7.) Steps 1. to 12. above, backwards.
Part 3 is straightforward, so it remains to show part 4.
We need to calculate (RT y)l for each of the 4 possibilities of l, but only l in I1 is
shown, as all other cases follow by the same manner. For l in I1 we need to show that
(RT y)l is the mean of all entries of y belonging to I4. We explain along the "="-sings
1.) Equation in the first line of the proof
2.) Definition of matrix-vector multiplication
3.) Definition of matrix multiplication
4.) ∆lh = 0 unless l = h so only that case remains
5.) Definition of ∆ll
6.) As explained above, only those indices of I remain, which belong to I4, since for
all others the entry is 0.
7.) As explained above, vl has #I4 elements.
Comparing the very first and last terms gives us exactly the statement of part 4.
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Lemma 4.5.5 In this Lemma we prove that the reduced design matrix is always a
square matrix. If parts of the statement or its proof are unclear, we recommend ex-
amining Definition 4.2.21, which is the definition of the reduced design matrix, and
Example 4.2.24 where there is an example with 3 variables.
The reduced design matrix has in its columns the coding of the coefficients of the
intercept, the main effects and the interaction coefficients. In its rows, the individual
cells. The number of the individual cells is just the product over all of the category
sizes. So we have N variables, and for each of these variables we have ni cases, so the
product over all these cases is just the number of rows of the reduced design matrix.
On the other hand we have the number of the coefficients which will be estimated.
That can be calculated as follows: Since every variable will have one case as the ref-
erence case, there will be ni− 1 coefficients that can be calculated. And we take the
intercept, we take all the main effects, which is just the sum of all these ni− 1’s and
then the double interactions, which are the double products of these numbers, triple
interactions and so on. In total, for every subset of {1, ...,N}, we take the product over
all of these (ni−1) terms.
We prove the equality by complete induction over N.
We start with the basic case of N = 2, which means the set we consider is the set
that consists of 1 and 2, which has 4 subsets: the empty sets, the singletons containing
1 and likewise 2, and finally the set that contains both. We then prove the formula by
taking all the subsets and taking the products. Remember that the product over the
empty set is 1, because there is nothing to be multiplied. That "1" will correspond to
the intercept. The product over index sets with just one element is just the term itself,
so we have 1+n1−1+n2−1 and finally the product. Now we can just multiply these
out and rearrange them to get n1n2, which can also be seen in Equation 4.
For the induction step we take the step from N− 1 to N, so we assume that the
statement is true for N−1, and we want to show it for N. Now, we start on the left hand
side of the equation and we split the sets over which we add up into 2 subsets, and these
are the sets that include 1 in the index and those that don’t and that’s the first step.
In the next step, since the terms on the left hand side of the addition all include
1, we can factor out n1− 1, because i = 1 is in all of these sets, and they are a factor
in all of the summands, and by the law of distribution, we can factor them out of the sum.
Now, on the right hand side in the next step we see that we have the exact formula
necessary for the induction step, and it has an index set of {2, ...,N}, so that’s N− 1
elements, so we can perform the induction step there and we know that that is the
product over all elements from 2 to n.
On the left hand side we just rewrote the index set, because if we sum over the set
of the indices from 1 to N that contain 1, and then take the product over all that do not
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contain 1, that is just the same as summing over those that do not contain 1. In the
next step we see that this term does not depend on the index 1 anymore, so that it’s just
the sum over the subsets from 2 to N, and so just like before what we can apply the
induction step and see that it’s the product of i from 2 to N over ni.
And now we have this very term multiplied by n1−1 and on itself, and if we fac-
torize that, we see that’s just n1 times the product of ifrom 2 to N over ni so that’s the
product of i from 1 to N over ni.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
We shall conclude with a reflection of what has been accomplished throughout this
thesis. We have introduced error terms into models which had previously only been
studied without them, or at least only spuriously included them. The situations in which
we applied them relied mostly on estimators, some of which work well with error terms,
while others don’t.
Including error terms made the models more complicated, but also more realistic,
as they simulate real life measurements, and all measurements are prone to error. In
particular, the results are relevant for application, as setting the price and advertizement
budget in areas of uncertainty and little information is a problem many companies face.
In Chapter 2 we introduced error terms to an allocation problem that has so far only
been studied in the deterministic case. The introduction of error terms led to issues
with the original proposed solution for the deterministic case, and they were remedied
by the application of an exploration-exploitation algorithm. A Monte Carlo simulation
was conducted to analyze the behavior of the algorithm and compare it to rules of
thumb commonly used by practitioners. Within the Monte Carlo study, we varied the
budget, the error terms and the functional forms, including the parameters regarding
the saturation levels and the elasticities at the optimum. The results demonstrated that
our proposed algorithm outperforms the rules of thumb. In particular, we recommend
the application of our algorithm as opposed to the rules of thumb.
In Chapter 3 we conducted aMonte Carlo simulation study to compare eight pricing
procedures in a monopolistic setting. Within this study, we varied the cost, number of
iterations, error terms, the functional forms and their parameters regarding the range
of the codomain. The results were rather clear, even when grouping the experimental
conditions with respect to levels of cost, elasticity and disturbance level. In general, we
recommend the application of the rule ‘LM’, which performs a regression of the data
under the assumption that the graph is a straight line, and using the known formula
(3.10) for the optimum in this case.
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The dataset that was the result of the simulation of Chapter 2 had a property that
indicated the usage of a full interaction model. That made the comparison tedious
enough to warrant its own article, detailed in Chapter 4. We used the analogy between
ANOVA and OLS to study the cell means within an ANOVA with the tools of the OLS
setting. We started by showing a relationship between the two OLS estimators before
and after a transformation that switched the reference category with a non-reference
category. This was accomplished by pulling a certain matrix ‘through the OLS’. In an
ANOVA context, we were able to interpret the situation as a model with all possible
higher interactions, and then construct the correct null hypotheses for comparisons
within that model.
This concludes the theory. The most exciting prospect of the thesis as it stands
is a possible application in an actual company. For example: How does the method
developed in Chapter 2 fare in practice? Once a realistic interval for the elasticities
has been determined, the algorithm is ready to go and we are looking forward to
practitioners using the method to increase their sales. While no newmethod for pricing
was developed in Chapter 3, it is still relevant for application in a field where no or
little information is available. In particular, it can be applied to the individual situation
a company is in, since the variables can be chosen quite liberally. Finally, the result
connecting the full ANOVA to the highest-interaction OLS and the results about the
hypothesesmight only be of theoretical or academical interest, however it is possible that
it is a rich area of previously untapped mathematical theories that might be developed
starting from these results.
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